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In our largely liberal modern culture, where the tenets of nineteenth century imperialism are often held in contempt, it is easy to be cynical about the imperial government's professed commitment to any principle which is based on morality or even on reciprocity. A concomitant of such a cynical outlook would be to view any expression of the principles of `trusteeship' as merely the rhetorical froth on the surface of a deep ocean of exploitation, political expediency, and economic determinism.
However, general views such as this must be tempered not only with an awareness of the contemporary intellectual and moral climate of imperial policy-making, but also with an awareness of the changing circumstances affecting metropole, colony, and the wider world. Furthermore, consideration must be given to the structures of government, and to the events at the periphery that both influenced these structures and were shaped by them. Andrew Porter has pointed out the "difficulty in linking structural constraints...to the thinking and action of those responsible for political or administrative decisions about national policy" [2], and I suggest that this linkage is complicated by the relationship between the imperial government and the colonial government, and by the relationship between the colonial government and the various groups under its jurisdiction and influence. Further, each component in this mosaic does not comprise thought and attitudes which are homogeneous.
Sadly, this complex of factors cannot be comprehensively detailed here. Whilst conceding that the account that follows is necessarily over-simplified, I will attempt to show how the factors sketched above contributed to the espousal and prosecution of the policy of native paramountcy between 1918 and 1939. In doing so, I will discuss: the long-term context of imperial trusteeship; Britain's general post-war aims in Africa; the main motivating influences behind the announcement of the native paramountcy policy; and the application of this principle in subsequent policy-making. I will focus on the policy statements that emanated from the imperial government in London, since I feel that the policy can be "understood only in the context of the...beat of impulses transmitted from the metropole." [3] It will be noted below, however, that these impulses were often reflected back from the periphery and re-transmitted in modified forms.
British policy in Africa between the wars was informed by long-term antecedents. In the nineteenth century, white settlers were encouraged in Africa, both to aid in the defence and support of the trade routes to India, and to act as `civilisers' of the `Dark Continent'. [4] A key factor in this civilising mission was the British drive to destroy the slave trade, a trade in which Zanzibar and the East African coastal strip were important elements. Part of Britain's nineteenth century African policy, then, was a "campaign to `regenerate' the continent by promoting the civilising virtues of commerce and Christianity." [5] British policy before 1914 certainly made European interests paramount, with the seeming incongruity between the Europeans' exploitative intent and the interests of the indigenous population (retrospectively) reconciled by Lord Lugard's conception of the `Dual Mandate':
Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her [sic] own industrial classes, and of the native races in their progress to a higher plane [6]
This dual mandate is an expression of a paternalistic conception of trusteeship, whereby wise and able Europeans oversee the development and civilisation of native peoples until such time (in an indefinite future) as they are capable of responsible, independent life. It is within this long-term context, where the rationale of colonisation is based partly on a combined policy of native development and European - and by association civilisation's - enjoyment of the fruits of Africa's resources, that the development of the native paramountcy policy must be considered.
In the shorter-term, British policy in Africa after 1918 was predicated on a number of broad principles: the consolidation of Britain's extended imperial territories; the stabilisation and maintenance of political and economic ties with the colonies; the perpetuation of white settler colonies; and the extension of the colonies' economic contribution to the empire through the reduction of the costs of colonial rule and the greater use of the colonies' productive assets. [7]
The latter point embodies the principle of `self-financing' colonies: colonies that could pay for their own administration, a status that could only be achieved by mobilising the productive forces of natives and settlers alike. This enforced mobilisation would contribute to the conflict and instability in Kenya in the early 1920s. [8]
Given these contextual factors - the rather indeterminate content to trusteeship, the need to create self-financing colonies, and the need to maintain control and order, I will now turn to why the imperial government developed a policy of native paramountcy in Kenya at the time that it did.
A long list of potential motivations for the adoption of the native paramountcy policy could be rehearsed, ranging from heightened humanitarian interest - greater post-war awareness of native peoples, idealism about self-determination, Fabianism [9] - to the desire to divert Indian immigrants' assertions of their equal rights. In assessing the establishment of the native paramountcy policy, it is necessary to discuss the policy statements and proposals that emerged from London, and specifically from successive Secretaries of State at the Colonial Office, where the main metropolitan responsibility for administrative policy-making for Kenya lay. [10]
The 1918 policy position on Africans in Kenya can be seen as one where, despite central government's commitment to fair treatment, little in the way of practical policy had been manifested that would demonstrate such a commitment. Equality of treatment was a crucial issue in Kenya because of the `racial demography' of the colony: in 1920 the population included some 6,000 Europeans, 17,000 `Asiatics', and 2.6 million Africans. [11] The Asiatic component was largely of Indian origin, and it was this long-established community's lobbying for equality and political representation - tied at various times and to varying degrees to the issue of Indian independence - that acted as an important catalyst in the creation of the native paramountcy policy.
In 1920 Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary, gave legal endorsement to a number of de facto policies which had antagonized the Indian community in Kenya: "segregation in the townships" [12], the exclusive `white highlands' policy, and the minimal role given to Indians in legislative and executive functions in the colony. These policies were, essentially, skewed in favour of the European settlers. This endorsement led to efforts by the Indian government and by the Secretary of State for India to alter this cluster of policies. [13] These interventions illustrate the pressures on the imperial government which came from internal and external sources.
After February 1921 Milner's successor, Winston Churchill, adopted a more conciliatory stance with regard to the `Indian question' in Kenya, but stressed that policy must be based on "equal rights for civilised men." [14] Churchill's position at this time can be seen as having been informed not only by a desire to propitiate Indian opinion in Kenya and in the subcontinent, but also by his awareness of the threat of European resistance in Kenya to the Montagu-Churchill proposals, which espoused changes to the constitution of the Kenyan administrative and legislative machinery. The threat of European revolt was implicit in a communication from Northey, the Kenyan Governor:
any attempt to force through an arbitrary settlement from home without local consent would lead to serious trouble [15]
This threat, and the concomitant of the loss of imperial authority in the colony, was to be a recurring theme in subsequent policy-making and responses. Churchill, early in 1922, made a speech at the East Africa Dinner in London stressing European paramountcy, clearly an attempt to mollify the settler community and the colonial government. This ignited Indian feeling once more, creating an atmosphere where Indian "protest was at an all-time high" [16] and where there was a "burgeoning alliance between the Africans and the Indians." [17]
Another observation here is that although the colonial government had close links with the European settlers and generally ensured that their views dominated in discourse with the imperial government [18], it would be a mistake to assume that the settlers' and the colonial government's interest were always identical.
This latter point is clear when one considers the problems facing the colonial government in the years after 1920. The power of the colonial government and its state apparatus to maintain order and control rested on a small and flimsy base: a "thin white line" [19] of colonial officialdom was buttressed by the use of civilian police forces and by clients and intermediaries amongst the native Africans. [20]
The desire for stability drew upon traditional structures of authority and leadership, structures which were themselves undergoing transformation as economic and social change encroached into Africa. Thus, traditional modes of authority based on land and lineage came under pressure as differing `modes of production' - settler estate production, native commodity production, and a burgeoning urban sector - came into conflict. [21]
In the period 1920 - 1923 the colonial state in Kenya was forced to try and find a balance between the varying forces that were acting upon it: there could be no simple application of a policy directed from London. In the sphere of labour, the goal of post-war economic development dictated that "recalcitrant" [22] African labour be transferred to settler estates, and to this end the colonial government was the author of extensive coercive legislation which was essential for mobilising and controlling the labour force, [23] moves which were coincident with the interests of settler production. One could argue that the inculcation of `habits of industry' in African labour was part of the mission of trusteeship, but more reasonable conclusion is that at this point policy was based on political and economic expediency. However, this level of coercion - "controls and pressures...far greater than those found in any other British colony in Africa" [24] - also created friction, resistance, and instability amongst Africans, all the more so since the policy favoured settler production over the modes of production which supported both native subsistence and reinforced traditional power structures. [25] Thus the colonial state, in attempting to develop a sound economic base to satisfy the principle of self-finance, helped to create conditions where "social disintegration and the loss of control" [26] loomed, conditions which might result in the erosion of the colonial state's legitimacy in the eyes of the governed.
So, by 1923 there were number of factors contributing to the climate of conflict and instability: strong-armed coercion of native labour (including a proto-`pass-law'), perceived identification of the colonial government with the European settlers, and social and economic changes brought about by urbanisation and migrant labour. Additionally, Churchill had once more changed tack: his new policy proposals were based on the 1922 Wood-Winterton report. This had been produced after the adverse reaction - both domestic and in Kenya and India - to Churchill's East Africa Dinner speech. This policy reiterated the earlier Montagu-Churchill proposals, and once again the policy fell upon stony ground in European Kenyan circles. Coryndon, the Governor, stated that the proposals were "entirely unacceptable to the Europeans and probably could not be imposed except by force." [27] It was in this immediate context of crisis and impasse that the `Devonshire declaration' of 1923 brought about the formal inauguration of the native paramountcy policy. The 1922 - 23 crises in Kenya were the immediate causes for the adoption of native paramountcy, but the long-run causes described at length above were inextricably linked to its espousal.
The policy of native paramountcy, wrote Devonshire, meant that:
the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail [28]
This statement of native paramountcy was perfectly compatible with the amorphous idea of trusteeship: in the long-term:
it is the mission of Great Britain to work continuously for the training and education of the Africans towards a higher intellectual[,] moral and economic level [29]
It was also made clear that this mission - the "protection and advancement of the native races" [30] - could not be devolved. These principles meant the de facto rejection of Indian aspirations for an equal franchise, since the effective Indian majority amongst the immigrants cannot be allowed to assume the responsibility for the
duty of trusteeship [which will] continue , as in the past, to be carried out under the Secretary of State for the Colonies by the agents of the Imperial Government, and by them alone [31]
This can all be interpreted as a way of `cutting away the ground beneath' the Kenyan Indians' feet, subverting their argument about equal immigrant rights by passing of implicit European supremacy as a paternalistic commitment to the welfare of the indigenous population.
The compromises that the `Devonshire Compromise' offered on potential Indian representation and the mitigation of previous anti-Indian legislation proved sufficient to secure the support of the Indian government, and the European settlers (reluctantly) accepted the measures, presumably since they recognised that European dominance was effectively guaranteed by Devonshire's proposals. The rhetoric of the Devonshire Declaration successfully sought to find a compromise between the European settlers and the Indians, and in doing so professed to place the interests of the African population at the top of any list of policy-making considerations. The `Indian question' was thus superseded by the `native question', leaving imperial and colonial governments freer to try and deal with the burgeoning problems of the economic integration and development of the mass of the population in Kenya. The next task is to assess how far commitment to the stated policy of native paramountcy was demonstrated by subsequent Labour, Conservative, and Coalition governments.
The short-lived Labour government of 1924 made "no appreciable alteration to British policy in Kenya." [32] The Conservative administration which succeeded it in November 1924 included Leo Amery as Colonial Secretary, his aim being "to build in East Africa a great white dominion. Theories of native paramountcy and Indian-European equality were impediments to achievement of this end." [33] In the policy-making of 1924 to 1929, where "the Governor and the Secretary attempted to by-pass the Devonshire settlement and perpetuate a [de facto] policy of European paramountcy" [34] we can perhaps get a representative idea of just how little the government was committed to native paramountcy. For example, the Ormsby-Gore Royal Commission report recommended that "the benefits [of colonial development] be extended [from serving civilisation generally] to the [serving the]European and Asian" [35] and that the European settlers be invited share the imperial burden of administering trusteeship - a clear sop to the settler interest and a clear divergence from the indivisibility of imperial central responsibility stated in the Devonshire Declaration. The ideas inherent in the Ormsby-Gore report - and especially that of the legitimacy of European dominance and enjoyment of Kenya's resources - were embodied in Governor Grigg's `Dual Policy'.
The dual policy again professed African development as the prime motivation, but also stressed that "European control in some form is necessary to the welfare and development of the African peoples." [36] The White Paper that Amery introduced in July 1927 [37] again paid lip-service to native paramountcy but effectively entrenched European paramountcy. [38] The Hilton Young Commission invoked by the White Paper included among its recommendations the need to "define, protect and further African interests" [39], and proposed the creation of an office of Governor General to control Kenya, an office over which the local government had only advisory powers. These two aspects of the report were ill-received by Europeans in Kenya since they were interpreted as truncating local power and promoting in a practical way the interests of the Africans. The settler disapproval to these proposals was as nothing to their furiously vehement condemnation of the two 1930 White Papers of the Labour government. [40] These two documents sought to clearly define terms, stressed native paramountcy, and proposed a `High Commissioner for Native Policy' responsible only to the Secretary of State (again, a usurpation of local powers). The force of the settler's response and the attitude of the colonial government quickly rendered any application of these principles impracticable. [41] The subsequent revision and enfeeblement of Labor's proposals by a Joint Committee in Parliament ended the prospect of "drastic reform in East Africa" [42] and paved the way for "[t]he European Community's Triumph in Kenya, 1931 - 39." [43]
I have labored these points in order to bring out the fact that so long as the idea of native paramountcy remained just that - an idea without substance in practical policy-making - the European settlers and the colonial government would be able to adopt the principle whilst still pursuing the policies of European supremacy that had been long-established in reality.
In conclusion, I would argue that although the commitment to native paramountcy may have been sincerely held at some levels of the policy-making process, the commitment to it by the imperial and colonial governments was never more than rhetorical and was rarely manifested in practical proposals, except perhaps in the case of the Labour government of 1929 to 1931, whose aspirations foundered on the rock of settler resistance. This overall lack of commitment can be seen in the constant primacy of consideration afforded to settler interests and in the retraction of reformist proposals whenever they encountered settler resistance. The coincidence of the interests of the imperial government and those of the settlers, and the need to retain stability were too compelling for the imperial government to risk imposing practical policies that would promote native paramountcy, even if the will to impose such measures had been stronger.
All this suggests that it was the very vagueness and flexibility of the ideas - trusteeship, native paramountcy, dual mandate, dual policy - that lent them their attractiveness to imperial government, colonial government, and settler alike. Given the cloak of `terminological inexactitude', it was possible for governments and administrators to parrot their adherence to the policy of native paramountcy whilst never making explicit when and how this policy was to be implemented. Whenever detailed definitions and policy were propounded, the adverse reaction from the settlers and the colonial government was usually enough to render them inoperable. Despite the widespread rhetorical commitment to the policy of native paramountcy, we can perhaps suggest that this was never enough to overcome the dominant institutional ideas and policy-making expediencies of the interwar years.
Long-standing intellectual and cultural ideas are also of significance, in that they are incorporated in the institutions and structures of policy-making. It is revealing that in 1947 the Kenyan Governor Sir Philip Mitchell could still write of Kenyan Africans:
How primitive the state of these people is, and how deplorable the spiritual, moral and social chaos in which they are adrift[. These] are things which can perhaps only [be] realised by those who are in close personal touch with the realities of the situation. [44]
It is perhaps in the deeply-embedded cultural and political assumptions that inform these words - as well as in the economic, political and strategic expediencies and imperatives - that we can find some of the reasons for the disparity between the rhetorical professions of governments and administrators and the reality of the policies that they implemented.
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Berman, Bruce
and
Lonsdale, John - Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa. Book One: State and Class; James Currey, 1992
Cain, P. J.
and
Hopkins, A. G. -British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688 - 1914; Longman, 1993
also
British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914 - 1990; Longman, 1993
Devonshire, Duke of - Indians in Kenya (Cmd. 1922); HMSO, 1923
Dilley, M. R. - British Policy in Kenya Colony; Frank Cass, 1966
Gregory, Robert - India and East Africa: A History of Race Relations Within the British Empire 1890 - 1939; OUP, 1971
Hargreaves, John - Decolonization in Africa; Longman, 1988
Hailey, Baron W. M. H - Native Administration in the British African Territories Part I; HMSO, 1950
Lonsdale, John
and
Berman, Bruce - The Colonial State in Kenya 1895 - 1914, in Journal of African History 20 (1979)
Porter, Bernard - The Lion's Share; Longman, 1996
Robinson, Kenneth - The Dilemmas of Trusteeship; OUP, 1965
[1] Although the area in question was called the East Africa Protectorate until its annexation in July 1920, I will use the term Kenya throughout
[2] Andrew Porter, European Imperialism, 1860 - 1914, Macmillan (1994), p. 49
[3] P. J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688 - 1914, Longman (1993), [hereafter referred to as Volume 1], p. 361
[4] ibid., p. 354
[5] ibid., p. 353
[6] Lord Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, Frank Cass (1965), p. 617
[7] For these aims, see Kenneth Robinson, The Dilemmas of Trusteeship, OUP (1965), Ch. 1, passim; P. J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914 - 1990, Longman (1993), [hereafter referred to as Volume 2], pp. 202 - 11; and M. R. Dilley, British Policy in Kenya Colony, Frank Cass (1966), p. 137
[8] For the `self-financing' principle, see Cain and Hopkins, Volume 2, pp. 205 - 6; for economic development and conflict, see John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman, The Colonial State in Kenya 1895 - 1914 (Journal of African History 20), and Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa Book One: State and Class, James Currey (1992), passim
[9] see Dilley, p. 139, and Robert Gregory, India and East Africa: A History of Race Relations Within the British Empire 1890 - 1939 (OUP, 1971), pp. 133 - 7
[10] In this account, I draw heavily on Robert Gregory's India and East Africa
[11] Figures in Baron W. M. H. Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories Part I (HMSO, 1950), p. 87
[12] Gregory, p. 190
[13] ibid., pp. 194 - 8
[14] ibid., p. 201 (my emphasis)
[15] (cited) ibid., p. 202
[16] ibid., p. 215
[17] ibid., p. 216
[18] Dilley, p. 276
[19] John D. Hargreaves, Decolonisation on Africa, Longman(1988), p. 12
[20] ibid., pp. 11- 12
[21] see Berman and Lonsdale, pp. 105 - 6, Lonsdale and Berman, passim, and Hargreaves, Ch. 1, passim
[22] Berman and Lonsdale, p. 106
[23] ibid., p. 107
[24] ibid., p. 116
[25] ibid., passim
[26] ibid., p. 121
[27] Gregory, p. 222
[28] Cmd. 1922, p. 10
[29] ibid.
[30] ibid.
[31] ibid.
[32] Gregory, p. 268
[33] ibid., p. 284
[34] ibid., p. 283
[35] ibid., p. 287
[36] Cmd. 3234, cited in Gregory, p. 289
[37] Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa
[38] see Gregory, p. 303
[39] ibid., p. 305
[40] Statement of the Conclusions of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as regards Closer Union in East Africa, and Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa
[41] Gregory, Ch. X, passim
[42] ibid., p. 368
[43] Ibid., (Chapter title), p. 410
[44] cited in Basil Davidson, The Black Man's Burden, James Currey (1992), p. 179