Chairman STOKES.
Gentlemen, would you raise your right hands. Do you solemnly swear the
testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. McCLOY. I do.
Mr. COOPER. I do.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you, you may be seated.
The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Gary Cornwell.
Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Would you have identified for the record, counsel, the
gentleman who has so ably assisted President Ford and who will be
assisting these gentlemen?
Mr. CORNWELL. It is Mr. Dave Belin. He was a member of the Warren
Commission staff and he has been here as counsel for the President.
Mr. McCLOY. He is not acting as counsel for me. I know him and have
great respect for him but he is not here as my counsel.
Mr. CORNWELL. Senator Cooper, I am sure that the committee will wish to
explore with you whatever areas you may wish to elaborate on or that you
may have any disagreement with in respect to the President's testimony.
I just have one question I would like to ask you.
You are quoted as stating in a televised broadcast recently that there
were disagreements among the commission members, that, and I quote:
I think the most serious one of the ones that come to me most vividly,
of course, it the question of whether or not the first shot went through
President Kennedy and then through Governor Connally.
Would you mind explaining to us the nature of that disagreement and how
it was resolved?
Senator COOPER. If you
don't mind, may I make just a short preliminary statement?
First, I do want to thank the chairman and members of the committee for
inviting the remaining members of the Warren Commission to be here. I
think it has importance that we can give you our view of our work, our
responsibilities, at a time 14 years before this date.
Also, I appreciate the fact that recent studies and events in the
intelligence community have raised new questions which have caused you
to conduct this investigation.
I would like to say that I agree wholeheartedly with the statement made
by President Ford. We conducted our investigation, in the way he
explained. I don't know whether you will go into that question with me,
but we were not pressured in any way by any person or by any
organization. We made our own decisions, as the President had asked us
to do, and as we determined to do on the basis of what we thought was
right and objective.
We knew each other. I had known every member of the commission before in
some way. I cannot say we were intimate friends but we did know each
other.
We did have disagreements at times in the commission and, as I have
noted, I think the chief debate grew out of the question as to whether
there were two shots or three shots and whether the same shot that
entered President Kennedy's neck penetrated the body of Governor
Connally.
The original judgment of the FBI, the Secret Service, and the CIA was
that there were three shots. I don't think that convinced us except as a
statement by people, many of them who were familiar with ballistics.
This question troubled me greatly. If not the first witness, one of the
first witnesses, was Governor Connally of Texas. I remember very clearly
this testimony. He said, "I heard a shot, I turned immediately to
the right, and looked over my shoulder in the direction of the Texas
School Book Depository." Later, he said, "I am familiar with
firearms and I knew the shot came from that direction. I then turned
back, I wanted to look at the President, over my left shoulder. In
turning back, I knew I was struck by a bullet." He then fell or was
pulled into the lap of his wife who was sitting to his left in the
jumpseat, and he said, while lying there, he heard a shot and there fell
over on him, into, I believe his hands, brain tissue, which, of course,
he believed came from the President.
We heard later the testimony of ballistics experts. Some contended that
because of the time element and relying to some degree upon the Zapruder
films and other films, that is was not possible to turn off three shots
in such a limited specified time. Others testified that certainly there
was the time, that the rifle was a perfect rifle for that kind of
firing, that the alignment was correct, there was a slight deviation at
the end, but it was perfectly possible within the area and time space,
which was I think between 5 seconds and 8 seconds.
I must say, to be very honest about it, that I held in my mind during
the life of the Commission, as I have since, that there had been three
shots and that a separate shot struck Governor Connally. It was
determined, as shown in the report of the Commission, which I can read
to you, but I know you are familiar with the report. It states there was
disagreement on this issue, particularly as the subject was debated,
that there were different opinions about it.
The majority believed that the same shot struck both President Kennedy
and Governor Connally, but the report ended by saying, in effect,
whatever was the fact, whether there was one, whether two or three
shots, that it did not alter the conclusion of the Commission that
Oswald was the sole assassin and there was no conspiracy.
Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. McCloy,
again I am sure the committee may wish to explore with you whatever
comments you may have in light of the President's testimony and which
you may agree or disagree with, but I would like to ask you about one
subject matter. In an interview with our staff previously, and I hope I
am quoting you substantially accurately, you expressed the view that the
Commission did have enough time to reach its conclusions, but that you
were greatly disturbed by the rushed composition and writing of the
report.
I wonder if you would explain that to us and comment upon it, if you
would.
Mr. McCLOY. I will be very glad to. I would like to read a very brief
statement from some notes about my general attitude toward this
examination and the conclusions which we arrived at 14 years ago.
With respect to this particular question that you put to me, there was a
book called I think, "Rush to Judgment," or some such title,
and I had that in mind when I received this inquiry. There was no
"rush to judgment." We came to a judgment in due course. There
were some questions of style in regard to the preparation of the report
where I would like to have had sort of a lawyer-like chance to make it a
little more clear, from my point of view, as to what our conclusions
were, but I had no question whatever about the substance of the report.
As I say, it had only been a matter of style and I had a feeling at the
end we were rushing a little bit the last few days to get to print
rather than to arrive at any conclusions. We had already arrived at our
conclusions. It was just a matter of putting them into good form.
I may anticipate some of your questions in this very brief statement I
will read from my notes here, but I would like to put one or two points
before you, if I may.
You, of course, know I was appointed by President Johnson to this
Commission. He called me up personally and asked me to serve, and he
referred to some of my prior experience in government. I had known
President Johnson before and he was aware of some earlier work I had
done in the investigative field. I gathered that this was one of the
reasons why he desired to have me serve.
He personally enlisted, I think, all our services, and we all had a deep
sense of responsibility to present to the President and to the people
the facts, all the facts, relating to the assassination.
I believe that the Commission did acquit itself of that responsibility.
I had a strong impression after our first meeting with the Commission,
which we had early on, that each of the men--let's put it this way, not
one of the members of the Commission had any prior conceptions as to
facts surrounding the assassination. As Chief Justice Warren very
bluntly put it, "truth is our only goal."
There are one or two things that I would like to say in addition to the
reaffirmation of my belief that the report of the Commission does
contain all the essential facts surrounding the assassination. I think
it has stood well the test of time, and in short, I think it is a
straightforward, objective, and reliable report of the essential
circumstances of that great crime.
I don't want to reexamine all of the evidence or defend the conclusions
here. Probably, if I tried to defend them, it would take up too much
time in the first place, and in the second place, it probably wouldn't
be looked upon as an objective analysis when I got through with it.
But I do wish to point out one or two things that I think have not been
sufficiently stressed, as far as I can tell, in the course of this
investigation. We are, in New York, handicapped by the fact we don't
have any newspapers and we can't follow from day to day what has
transpired down here. But I would like to attempt to put in perhaps
better perspective before this committee the contributions which were
made to the essential integrity and accuracy of the report by the
trained and conscientious investigators who took part in making it.
And I would refer, first, to the much-maligned Dallas police force. I
also refer, of course, to the FBI investigators and those of the CIA who
were called on to assist, and the Secret Service and a number of other
agencies. And, lastly, I would like to do justice to the Commission
itself and its staff in arriving at these conclusions. These factors
have not been sufficiently stressed either here, so far as I know, and
indeed, in any of the commentaries I have seen over the years.
By and large, I would say
that we had the benefit of very skilled and valuable investigative
services in the course of reaching our conclusions.
In the course of our work, I had ample opportunity to come in contact
with the people that were doing this work and I have, generally, a very
favorable impression of the quality of that work. And coming back for a
moment to the Dallas police force, I think it was rather remarkable the
way that police force, bedeviled as they were by newspaper reporters and
the press at that point and by the other pressures they were under,
performed and that they should be given credit for the prompt and, in
many cases, excellent police work which resulted in the very early
apprehension of the assassin.
The Dallas police were responsible for the early collection of evidence
which came to be of vital significance and they were also beset by all
of these other agencies that were pounding around them at the time,
including those of the Commission. I was rather impressed with the way
they handled themselves in spite of the fact that there was a great
dereliction of duty in connection with the provisions they made for the
security of Oswald, resulting in his death. But my point is, in spite of
that you can't and shouldn't deny the Dallas police credit for an
assiduous and, I think, prompt and efficient bit of police work.
The FBI made some mistakes and some misinterpretations, and we
criticized them for the lack of full surveillance of Oswald that they
probably should have undertaken before the assassination. But their work
generally, I think, was of rather high order, and I don't see that, as
President Ford said, the mistakes, such as I can recall them now, had
any relevancy or any reflection upon the conclusions which the
Commission reached.
I would refer to the staff of the Commission itself, which has already
been referred to by President Ford. It is not true we didn't have our
own investigative facilities. There was a very distinguished group of
litigating lawyers that constituted the staff. I remember I was called
upon to make suggestions as to who we might get from my knowledge of the
bar. We had a very impressive list and they did excellent work.
It is not true, as has been alleged, that we relied entirely on the
agencies of the Government. Mr. Ford has brought that all out. I
subscribe to what he said.
But I would also like to refer to the Commission itself. The Commission
itself had considerable ability, in terms of experience in investigative
procedures. Here is Judge Cooper; he was also a judge as well as a
Senator. He was a county judge in Kentucky, and I am sure in connection
with that position he had a great deal of experience in investigative
work and in balancing judgments on evidence.
Hale Boggs, who is deceased, had a lot of investigative work in the
House, certainly. I don't know that he ever held an office as a
prosecuting attorney, but Senator Russell, who is also now dead, had
been, as I recall, a county attorney or prosecuting attorney.
Justice Warren, himself, had been not only the former Governor of the
State of California, but he had been attorney general and I think he had
been a State prosecuting officer before that.
You know the experience of Allen Dulles. As for myself, I don't want to
overemphasize it, but I spent 10 years of my life on a case which people
have now forgotten about, but it was a rather famous case at one time.
It was called the Black Tom case. It involved litigation--you probably
heard of it--it had international and national prominence, at one time.
It is hard to conceive of any experience that required any more exacting
or more sustained investigative work than that litigation did. The
outcome of it finally didn't take place until just before the beginning
of World War II. It related to crimes that had been committed by the
German Government in this country while we were neutral in World War
I-murder, arson, explosions, and sabotage were involved. I won't go into
all the details of it, but it took years of my time and experience, and
I had rather extensive investigative training as a result of it.
I am simply saying that this Commission was far from a naive group. When
the President asked me to take this position, he referred to my Black
Tom experience. He said, you have a reputation for having some
investigative experience. But he said, what I have in mind is something
in the nature of the royal Commission which the British made such good
use of and still do.
It was something after that pattern that he was thinking in terms of the
Presidential Commission that he set up. I don't know if that throws a
great deal of light on what his motivations were, but certainly he put a
great deal of pressure on us m terms of the responsibility that he was
putting on our shoulders. He was clearly very sensitive of how important
an investigation this was.
So, I think the combination of the investigative experience, of not only
the staff but of the Commission itself, was rather impressive. They
weren't, as I say, naive. They had the know-how and the experience of
weighing facts and evidence. It may be some of them didn't attend all
the formal meetings, but the record doesn't show what work they did do
outside of meetings. For example, I personally traced every step that I
think that Oswald took after he committed the crime.
I sat there in the little cubbyhole he had from which he shot at the
school depository; I worked and reworked the bolt of the rifle. I have
had a good bit of experience with firearms and I knew a good. bit about
ballistics. I spent a lot of time in match shooting, using bolt-action
rifles. And I tested for myself what I thought a man could do in terms
of firing that particular rifle. And the contacts that we had with the
various witnesses and the staff, none of which are a part of the record,
are perhaps not understood. I think if you had a realization of all this
work, you would find that the Commission as a whole was really most
assiduous in terms of its application to its task. It didn't simply sit
back and accept something that was handed to it.
Perhaps I would suggest that the sum total of the experience, of the
investigative experience of the Commission far exceeded that of all the
commentators that came along after the event and broke into print
purporting to be experts in the matter.
We, of course, had some questions and differences of view; we talked to
each other--Senator Cooper, I recall, had considerable doubt about this
question of the path of the bullet which hit Connally. If I may just
draw for a minute on my personal experience-perhaps I shouldn't do
this--but it influenced my judgment. It was an important element in
arriving at my own judgment in regard to that bullet, the so-called
single bullet theory.
Twice in my life, and I am sure a number of people in this room may have
had a somewhat similar experience, I stood right alongside of a man as
he was shot. The first man--it was in World War I in France--was killed.
The second man recovered from his wound. The circumstances of the second
experience were really quite amazing. I am convinced, after my
experience, that on occasion, when you are shot, you don't know the
minute you are hit. There is a sort of a perceptible period following
the impact before you get the full realization that you have been hit.
In the first case, it was a fellow officer in World War I. We were not
far apart and he quietly said, "Jack, I think I am hit." He
shortly collapsed subsequently and died of his wound.
The other experience, which is almost unbelievable, was in Berlin when
we were rehearsing for the reception of President Truman, who was going
to visit us at the American headquarters in Berlin after the war. I had
been, as you know, an official of the Government, Military Governor, and
later High Commissioner for Germany, and Gen. Lucius Clay, my
predecessor as Military Governor was with me, and we began to rehearse
the ceremony because President Truman was coming along that afternoon to
visit the headquarters.
We were rehearsing, for example, who would step up and first shake hands
with the President, when the bugles should sound off, et
cetera--"You are going to do this and you that." There was a
friend of mine who was on Clay's staff and who later became a very
distinguished jurist in Massachusetts. He became Chief Judge of the
Supreme Judicial Court. His name was Cutter, and we designated him to
pose as the President.
We said, "you are going to be President Truman, you are going to be
the President and are to stand here." We started through the
rehearsal. This was in front of the headquarters in Berlin and, by
George, Cutter turned to me at a certain point, sort of hesitated and
said, "Jack, I think I'm shot," and in a little while, he
collapsed. You can imagine what a tizzy that created.
There were Secret Service people all around. Here was the man we were
setting out to impersonate the President of the United States who was
shot. And here again there was a very definite perceptible period
following the shooting before he fully realized he was hit.
I know Governor Connally very well; I have shot quail with him and I
know he's a good shot and I know he is familiar with firearms. Frankly,
I don't think he knew exactly when he was hit. I saw his recent
testimony--at least somebody reported to me, perhaps indirectly, that he
wasn't as certain now as when he first appeared before us--before our
Commission when he said he was sure it wasn't the same shot which hit
President Kennedy which hit him. I don't know where that bullet could
have gone if it didn't go through Governor Connally. Moreover, Governor
Connally didn't know until the next day, I think it was, that he had
been shot in the hand, as well as in the body.
I am suggesting that the certainty which he felt earlier isn't entirely
reliable. The Germans have a word for it. They call it the
"nachschlag." I believe those who had been close to places
where people have been shot are frequently aware of a perceptible delay
on the part of the victim in registering an awareness of the shot.
Insofar as the conspiracy issue is concerned, there has been so much
talk about it that I don't think I need to dwell on it any further. I no
longer feel we simply had no credible evidence or reliable evidence in
proof of a conspiracy, but I rather think the weight of evidence is
affirmatively against the existence of a conspiracy, though it falls
short of proof.
I know how difficult, and you all know how difficult it is, to prove a
negative. Somebody may pop up at some point and come forth with some
affirmative testimony that would be credible when you have not been able
to find it. But we weren't able to find it in spite of all our rather
extensive efforts. And I think we inquired of every agency that
purported to have any information about it and all of the reports which
came back to us were negative.
I wouldn't know what kind of an agency could have told Oswald to stand
ready in Dallas to shoot the President of the United States or at some
other point when the opportunity arose. It was hard for me to concoct a
conspiracy, whether with the assistance of Oswald or not, when there
were so many fortuitous circumstances. Oswald clearly, in my judgment
and everybody else's judgment, I think, who purports to be objective
about it, was the undisputed assassin of the President of the United
States, and that in a very brutal manner he indisputably killed Tippit
closely following the assassination. He also had tried to kill General
Walker. If Walker hadn't pulled his head back the minute of the shot, he
would have been a goner, too.
Oswald, the evidence shows, was a killer and he was a loner. Having said
that, my chief objective is now to try to give this committee the
conviction that the Warren Commission was a rather well-equipped
organization, because of its experience and because of the standing of
the members, to perform its duties. This is relative to the question as
to what should be done if this situation arose again.
This is something that has been puzzling me as to what one should do,
because I know the disrepute in which the findings of the Commission,
our Commission, have been held. The Gallup Polls, I have been told, have
shown that some 80 percent didn't believe our report to have been
thorough and reliable.
I didn't talk this over with President Ford, but I was interested when
he was asked the question. He said he thought he would do pretty much
the same thing as President Johnson did. I had rather come to that
conclusion myself because I have the feeling--this may be too
subjective--that the Commission was a very thorough bipartisan unit, got
together and hammered out an objective, reliable report. It did act in
somewhat the same manner as the royal Commissions of Great Britain have
done in the past. They have proven to be a rather effective form of
investigating body.
I would hesitate to put legislation on the books now that would tend to
set a rigid form for future investigations. I think you have to deal
with the situations as they develop. I do believe that things have
improved and some defects disclosed. I believe better communication
between investigating agencies is apt to take place in the future,
partially due to the criticism we made in our report of the prior work
of the FBI in terms of surveillance, as well as in the findings of this
committee. I don't know, however, that you can today sit down and work
out a piece of legislation that ought to cover all future assassination.
Let's hope that we never have a recurrence.
Suppose I just stop here and let you carry on with any other questions
you may have, and I will try to answer them to the best of my ability.
Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you. That answered my question and I have no further
questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you, counsel. Do any other members of the
committee have questions?
Mr. Sawyer, the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. SAWYER. Just more of an observation than a question. I think that
the most puzzling and unsatisfactory part of the conclusions of the
Warren Commission, to me, had always been the single-bullet theory. I
had trouble with that. I think that the evidence that has been produced
before this committee, and what I think was a superior scientific
analysis by some NASA people who worked with that question, I think, at
least in this committee member's opinion, has made me a total convert to
the single-bullet theory, and I think we have, to any reasonable mind,
now proved that beyond a reasonable doubt.
I don't think there was any deficiency in the Warren Commission members.
I just think that there was a superior scientific analysis of it,
particularly one that made use of a still picture from the opposite side
of the street of Magruder which, by placement of things in a car, was
able to position Mr. Connally in the car at a position laterally,
considerably to the left of the President, which I had never really
appreciated before.. So that it was their conclusion that the bullet
that went through the President's neck could not have missed Governor
Connally.
Mr. McCLOY. I don't think
it could have missed Connally. I think we were a little lax in the
Commission in connection with the use of those X-rays. I was rather
critical of Justice Warren at that time. I thought he was a little too
sensitive of the sensibilities of the family. He didn't want to have put
into the record some of the photographs and some of the X-rays taken at
the time.
We took the testimony of course, of the doctors and probably with the
X-rays--we wouldn't have been able to read the X-rays if we hadn't had
the doctors' testimony. I believe later on a more thorough examination
of those pictures and the X-rays and photographs with the respective
positions of the President and Connally did produce a more convincing
proof of where that bullet went.
As I say, I don't know where else it could have gone. I have talked with
Governor Connally about it on a number of occasions, and I was very much
interested to see he was a little shaken the last time he testified
here. He had a conviction earlier that it was a second bullet that hit
him.
Mr. SAWYER. I think we have had some evidence that would tend to bear
out Governor Connally's recollection. I think there has been
considerable evidence now that the first bullet missed everything, and
it was the second bullet that hit the President and Governor Connally
which then coincides with his testimony because he probably would not
have heard the shot that hit him. But in any event, I also wanted to
commend you on your conclusionary statement in the Warren Commission
that there was no evidence of a conspiracy because you, as a lawyer, I
am sure, appreciate about as far as you can go in proving a negative is
to say that there was no evidence of the affirmative.
Mr. McCLOY. That's right.
Mr. SAWYER. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman
from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.
Mr. DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McCloy and Senator
Cooper, it is wonderful to see you again, particularly you, Senator
Cooper. I remember meeting you on a number of occasions when you served
in the Senate. It is a pleasure to see you here this morning.
Senator COOPER. Thank you. Pardon me, could you speak just a little bit
louder?
Mr. DODD. I will try and speak a little more clearly. It is nice to see
you here this morning. I would like to just ask you, if I could, one
question. You heard this morning the testimony of President Ford.
Senator COOPER. Yes.
Mr. DODD. And I specifically asked him some questions with regard to a
memo that was drafted by Mr. DeLoach from the FBI pursuant to a
conversation.
Senator COOPER. Yes.
Mr. DODD. That then Congressman Ford had with Mr. DeLoach.
Senator COOPER. Yes.
Mr. DODD. At the outset of the Warren Commission hearings.
President Ford, in his response to my question this morning, indicated
that it was not an uncommon thing for a Member of Congress to have a
relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, have someone
there you might know, talk over things with and so forth. That was the
gist, as I understood it, in part anyway, of his answer to my question.
My question to you, Senator Cooper, is this: As a member of the Warren
Commission and also as a Member of Congress, at the time that the Warren
Commission began its work, did you have any such meetings or interviews
with anyone from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Central
Intelligence Agency which you initiated on your own to report in a
confidential way the happenings of executive sessions of the Warren
Commission?
Senator COOPER. First, I never initiated nor did the FBI ever initiate
any conversation or correspondence with me. I met Mr. Hoover socially. I
never talked to him about anything connected with his work. We just met
him. I knew Mr. McCone chiefly because my wife was from California and
had known him. It happened his wife was from my State, Kentucky. We saw
each other socially, but never during this time or after did we ever
discuss the work of the Warren Commission or the work of the CIA as it
applied to the Warren Commission.
Mr. DODD. Thank you, Senator.
Senator COOPER. I never discussed with the Secret Service during this
time any of their duties or their responsibilities outside the hearings.
After it was over, 2 or 3 years later, I was accompanying President
Johnson to Kentucky on a trip. Mr. Youngblood of the Secret Service was
in the car with us. President Johnson got out and spoke to everybody on
a country road for 50 miles. Mr. Youngblood turned around and said--I
was in the same car--he said, "you remember what I told you?"
As he had told the Commission, it is almost impossible to protect the
President who wants to see the people.
Mr. DODD. Thank you, Senator.
Senator COOPER. I was asked this one question, and I am not going to
take up your time, but in order that my first answer may not be
misconstrued, would it be permissible for me to make two or three
comments?
Mr. DODD. Certainly.
Senator COOPER. First, I would like you to consider the difference in
the time from 1963 to date. The FBI, at that time, was headed by Mr.
Hoover who had been appointed Director continuously. He had, I would
say, a good reputation. I don't think anybody ever thought about the CIA
meddling in internal affairs.
The shock of the President's death called for an immediate
investigation. It actually lay in the jurisdiction of Texas. There was
no law that would permit the Congress to investigate. We were given that
right by statute, also the right to subpoena witnesses and also to give
immunity.
We never gave immunity to anyone. We provided complete protection to
witnesses--right of attorney, right of record, right to cross-examine,
and open hearing if they desired. Only Mr. Lane asked for an open
hearing. We also had advisers sitting in with us from Texas: Mr.
Jaworski, well-known today, the president of the American Bar
Association; also Mr. Louis Powell, now Justice Powell of the Supreme
Court, sat in at times. They took turns. And Mr. Eberstadt of New
Orleans, former president of the American Bar Association. Now, I just
want to say this. As far as the killing of the late President Kennedy,
we will always remember it with sadness. There is no evidence of any
kind except that is directed toward Oswald: his rifle was purchased
under an assumed name, but directed to his post office box; the
cartridge shells which were down on the floor; the tests which showed
that this was the only rifle which had the markings which were shown on
the bullets; the fact that a man was seen by several witnesses, not
identified, but seen in the window with the general description of what
he looked like; his flight immediately; the fact that within a few
minutes it was radioed that the killer perhaps came from the Texas Book
Depository and radio cars were circling the city.
That is the reason Tippit was circling the city; the fact Tippit was
killed and his killing witnessed by several witnesses brought Oswald to
the Texas police offices. The police had already found the cartridges
and the rifles and the bag in the Texas School Depository and within a
half an hour, those facts were known.
Now, people have said that somebody told them that they saw somebody on
the railroad bank or saw somebody going over the bank, but no one has
ever been able to show any cartridges, any rifle, any pistol, no one has
ever found anything other than the evidence about Oswald.
I would like that to be known; these facts are in the summary which I
think is a very good one. The intelligence investigation under the
leadership of Senator Church, which I know has helped cause this
investigation by you, points out that the agencies did not disclose
certain facts to us and that certain plots were going on. At the time we
were in session, they should have been disclosed to us. They were not
disclosed to us. We knew nothing about them.
There was no testimony of conspiracy--Oswald's efforts to get in touch
with the Soviets and with the Cuban Fair Play groups in New York were
rebuffed, rebuffed at every step--I think he felt he was a failure and
for the United States and for President Kennedy and all of us. He knew
he was a failure at everything he tried, frustrated, with a very sad
life, but he was a Marxist. Very curious, at the age of about 13 years,
he began to study Marxism and he kept on in his writing, affirming that
he was a Marxist.
Probably he did want to show himself as a great, supreme Marxist.
Rather, like the anarchists of the last century, he didn't care if he
was killed or not. They just wanted to be known.
We found no trace of any conspiracy. Our staff not only received the
reports from these agencies, they examined them. They questioned them.
They went to the files of the FBI and CIA to see if there were any
informants, if Oswald was an informant. They did a thorough job and I
join with President Ford and Mr. McCloy in praising them. But they did
not disclose to us all the facts.
I wanted to make this statement to make it clear that I concur wholly in
what President Ford and Mr. McCloy have said, that we did our best. We
found what we could at that time--the truth. If somebody else can find
something else which we didn't find, that, of course, is a duty on their
part, as is the truth. It will be the truth.
I do make this final statement. I don't think many people have ever read
the report. Who has read 26 volumes of this case? How many read the
summary? If you read the summary, it takes a long time. Everything is in
there and one of the reasons I know few people have read the summary is,
there are some very interesting little side stories in it, that
newspapermen and others would have published.
For example--and I will quit--the press dodger that was put out on the
streets in Dallas. In this summary, it shows that that author just
before he was discharged from the Army in Munich, he and a comrade
demanded to go back to Dallas; they were trying to figure out ways they
could make the quickest, and they said, we will go back to Dallas and we
will infiltrate the John Birch and YAF and that's what they did.
I just have talked too long, but I congratulate you on the efforts you
are making. I am very proud to come back, to speak on the disinterested
effort we have made and I believe that, with all due respect, that the
decisions we made, when we turned our final report over to President
Johnson, will stand in history.
Mr. DODD. Thank you very much, Senator, for your statement. Mr. McCloy,
if I can I would like to just address the very same question I did to
Senator Cooper, the first initial question I had for him, the same one I
had in the light of the questioning, that I followed this morning with
President Ford, and that is whether or not you, as a member of the
Commission, at any time, whether during the organizational meetings of
the Warren Commission or any time after that, initiated any contact on
your own in a confidential manner to report or confide in those agencies
with regard to the happenings of the Warren Commission?
Mr. McCLOY. No, I had no such contact. I saw their agents and talked to
them but I initiated no contact with them whatever.
Mr. DODD. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Time has expired. Any more members seeking recognition?
Mr. McCLOY. May I make one addition to the record. I don't like to let
that Berlin situation stand without pointing out the reason that Mr.
Cutter was shot was because a major was cleaning his pistol three or
four blocks from where this took place and the bullet came in and hit
this man that was posing as President of the United States, and
everything quieted down after that. But it was an extraordinary
circumstance.
Chairman STOKES. Gentlemen, Mr. McCloy and Senator Cooper, on behalf of
the committee, I want to thank both of you for having appeared here
today and taken the time to give us the benefit of your observations
with reference to the service you rendered while members of this very
distinguished panel of Americans, and you certainly have been very
helpful to this committee, and we also appreciate the time you have
expended with our staff, and at this time, does counsel have something
further?
Mr. CORNWELL. Before we adjourn, it might be a good idea to make a
matter of record JFK exhibits F-476 and F-477, a chart of the Warren
Commission and a photographic blowup of the Warren Commission members
that have been displayed during the testimony of the last three
witnesses, and perhaps we could enter them into the record at this time?
Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at
this time.
So again we thank you very much for having appeared, and you are now
excused.
Mr. McCLOY. Thank you very much.
Senator COOPER. Thank you.
Chairman STOKES. At this time the committee will stand in recess until 1
p.m., in the afternoon.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 1
p.m. of the same day.]
