HEADING: THE FUNCTIONS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS
Recruitment;
Scrutiny and Influence;
Expression and
Other functions.

Handout 3/15 R
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS
Read through the following information and summarise it
under the four headings given.
Return this handout when you have completed the summary.
The House fulfils the functions of both manifest and latent legitimisation, but on a modest scale. It is called upon to give the seal of approval to Bills but, if it fails to give that approval, it can be overridden later by the House of Commons under the provisions of the Parliament Acts. Only in very rare circumstances - as in the case of a Bill to lengthen the life of a Parliament - is its veto absolute. By virtue of being one of the two chambers of Parliament and by meeting regularly and uninterruptedly, the House may have a limited claim to fulfilling a function of latent legitimisation. However, such a claim is largely offset by the House having no claim to being a representative assembly and by its limited legislative authority.
The House provides some of the personnel of government. Ministers are drawn from Parliament and, by convention, predominantly now from the elected House. The government recruits a number of ministers from the upper House (another name for the House of Lords) primarily for political and managerial reasons.
Though the government is normally assured of getting its Bills through the House, it is not necessarily guaranteed getting them through in the form it wants them. It is therefore sensible to have ministers in the Lords in order to "explain" Bills and to marshal support. In addition, the House provides a pool from which the Prime Minister can draw in order to supplement ministers drawn from the Commons. The advantage offered by peers is that, with no constituency responsibilities, they are able to devote more time to ministerial duties than is the case with ministers who have 'constituency duties to attend to.
However, the supply of ministers is a limited one. A minimum of two peers serve in the Cabinet (Lord Chancellor and Leader of the House) but usually no more than four. About ten to fifteen other ministers are drawn from the Lords, supplemented by seven whips (including the Chief Whip). The number of ministers does not match the number of ministries, with the result that the whips have to take on responsibility for answering for particular departments - another difference from the House of Commons, where the whips have no responsibility for appearing at the dispatch box. Even with a small number of posts to be filled, the government still has difficulty on occasion in finding suitable peers for ministerial office. The problem under Conservative governments has been that many of the regular attenders are too old to serve or have outside interests they wish to pursue. As a result, the government has had to draw on occasion on peers who are young and relatively new to the House. For Labour, the problem is that there arent many Labour Lords!
It is in its remaining functions that the House of Lords is significant. The House performs an important role as an agent of scrutiny and influence, especially the former. The House does not undertake the task of scrutiny on behalf of constituents, as peers have none. Rather, the House undertakes a more general task of scrutiny. Three features of the House render it particularly suitable for the detailed scrutiny of legislation. Firstly, as an unelected House, it cannot claim the legitimacy to reject the principle of measures agreed by the elected House. Thus, basically by default, it focuses on the detail rather than the principle. Secondly, its membership includes people who have distinguished themselves in particular fields - such as the sciences, the law, education, industry, industrial relations - who can look at relevant legislation from the perspective of practitioners in the field rather than from the perspective of elected party politicians. And, thirdly, the House has the time to debate non-money Bills in more detail than is usually possible in the Commons - unlike in the Commons, there is no provision for a guillotine and all amendments are discussed. The House thus serves as an important revising chamber, trying to ensure that a Bill is well drafted and internally coherent.
In order to improve the Bill, it will suggest amendments, most of which will be accepted by the Commons. In terms of legislative scrutiny, the House has thus developed a role which is viewed as complementary to, rather than one competing with (or identical to), that of the Commons.
The House also scrutinises, and occasionally influences, government policy. Peers can debate policy in a less partisan atmosphere than the Commons and are not subject to the constituency and party influences that dominate in the elected House. They are therefore in a position to debate issues of public policy that may not be at the heart of the partisan battle and which, consequently, receive little attention in the Commons. Given their backgrounds, peers are also often - though not always -able to debate public policy from the perspective of those engaged in the subject.
The House, for example, is able to debate science policy with an authority denied the lower House. The Lords contains several distinguished scientists; the Commons does not. When discussing education, the House will normally hear from peers who are professors, university chancellors, vice-chancellors, and former secretaries of state for education. The Commons has members who used to be, but are no longer, lecturers and teachers.
The House, like the Commons, also fulfils a number of expressive functions. It can bring issues on to the political agenda in a way not always possible in the Commons. MPs are wary of raising issues that may not be popular with constituents and which have little salience in terms of party politics. Peers are answerable to no one but themselves. They can raise whatever they feel needs raising. The House may thus debate issues of concern to particular groups in society which MPs are not willing to address. Formally, it is not a function the House is expected to fulfil. In practice, peers take up issues that concern them, often alerted to the issue by outside bodies. Sometimes the issues raised are obscure - one peer in the 1980s initiated a debate on unidentified flying objects (UFOs) - but some are of great concern to particular groups: the Lords, for example, helped put the issue of homosexual law reform on the political agenda in the 1960s.
The House also has the potential, only marginally realised, to express views to citizens and influence their stance on public policy. The function is limited by the absence of any democratic legitimacy, the capacity to influence deriving from the longevity of the House and its place as one of the two chambers of Parliament, as well as from the authority of the individual peers who may be involved. The scope to fulfil this function has increased slightly as a result of the introduction of the television cameras (greater visibility with which to mobilise support) and the limited use of committees (issuing reports that may mobilise support among affected groups), but the opportunities remain limited.
To these functions may be added a number of others, some of which are peculiar to the upper House. Foremost among these is a judicial function. The House constitutes the highest court of appeal within the United Kingdom. Though formally a function residing in the House as a whole, in practice it is carried out by a judicial committee comprising the Lord Chancellor, ex-lords chancellor, the law lords and peers who have held high judicial office. Between five and ten will normally sit to hear a case. Hearings take place in a committee room, though the decision is delivered in the chamber. By convention, other peers do not take part in judicial proceedings. One peer earlier this century did try to participate but was ignored by the other peers on the committee until he went away.
Like the Commons, the House also retains a small legislative role, primarily in the form of private Members' legislation. In the 1960s, several major measures of social reform - on divorce, abortion, and homosexuality - passed through both Houses as private Members' Bills. Peers can introduce private Members' Bills and a small number achieve passage, but it is small - even compared to the number of such Bills promoted by MPs. In 1990 91, for example, eighteen private Members' Bills introduced by MPs were passed, but only one introduced by a peer.
The introduction of such Bills by peers is more important in fulfilling an expressive function - allowing views on the subject to be aired - than it is in fulfilling a legislative role. In the 1995 96 session, for example, a Sexual Orientation Discrimination Bill was introduced which, even though it stood little chance of passage (there was no time in the Commons), got the problem of discrimination against homosexuals discussed. The time given to private Members' legislation is important but not extensive: it occupies usually less than 3% of the time of the House.
The Lords is also ascribed a distinct role, that of a constitutional safeguard. This is reflected in the provisions of the Parliament Acts. The House, as we have noted, retains a veto over Bills to extend the life of a Parliament. It is considered a potential brake on a government that seeks to act in a dictatorial or generally unacceptable manner: hence it may use its limited power to amend or, more significantly, to delay a Bill. In practice, though, the power is a limited one. The House lacks a legitimate elected base of its own that would allow it to act, on a substantial and sustained basis, contrary to the wishes of an elected government.
In combination, these various functions render the House a useful body - especially as a revising chamber and for raising and debating issues on which peers are well informed - but one that is clearly subordinate to the elected chamber. The fact that the House is not elected explains its limited Functions; it is also the reason why it is considered particularly suited to fulfil the functions it does retain.

SCRUTINY AND INFLUENCE ONE: LEGISLATION
Legislation occupies an increasing proportion of the time of the Lords, with almost two-thirds of the time of the House given over to it. Bills in the Lords have to go through stages similar to those in the House of Commons. There are, though, some differences in procedure e.g. some Bills do not have a Committee stage. After second reading, a motion may be moved "That this Bill be not committed" and, if agreed to, the Bill then awaits third reading. This procedure is usually employed for Bills when there is no desire to present amendments. For those Bills that do receive a committee stage, it is usually taken on the floor of the House.
Furthermore, all amendments tabled are debated. The less crowded timetable of the House allows such a procedure. It has the advantage of allowing all peers with an interest or expertise in a measure to take part and ensures consideration of any amendments they believe to be relevant. There is thus the potential for a more thorough consideration than is possible in the Commons. The emphasis, as we have seen, is on ensuring that the Bill is well drafted and coherent. Most Lords' amendments are accepted by the Commons. This is not surprising given the nature of most amendments (tidying up language and meaning) and the fact that many are actually introduced by the government. On some Bills, though, the government proves resistant to demands for change. This resistance has usually been sufficient to prevent amendments being made. However, as we shall see, the House has also proved notably willing in recent years to carry amendments moved by back-bench peers.
Report and third reading provide further opportunities for consideration. Report may be used by government to bring forward amendments promised at committee stage and also to offer new amendments of its own. It is possible also for amendments to be made at third reading and this opportunity is variously employed.
SCRUTINY AND INFLUENCE TWO: EXECUTIVE ACTIONS
As in the House of Commons, there are various means available for scrutinising the actions of the executive. The principal means available on the floor of the House are those of debate and questions. Off the floor of the House, there are select committees and, at the unofficial level, party meetings.
| Debates. |
Debates, as in the Commons, take place on motions. These may express a particular view or they may be take the form either of "take note" motions or motions calling for papers. "Take note" motions are employed in order to allow the House to debate reports from select committees or to discuss topics on which the government wishes to hear peers' views: ministers use "take note" motions rather than motions calling for papers because - with the latter - they are responsible for supplying the papers being called for. Motions calling for papers are used by back-benchers to call attention to a particular issue; at the end of the debate it is customary to withdraw the motion, the purpose for which it was tabled - to ensure a debate - having been achieved.
All peers who wish to speak in debate do so and there is a greater likelihood than in the Commons a debate will actually result, rather than a load of shouting as often occurs in the Commons. Party ties are less rigid than in the Commons and peers are more likely to consider and respond to points made by other peers.
These debates ate also supplemented by short debates. One day each month, usually a Wednesday, is set aside for two short debates, each of up to two-and-a-half hours in length. These are occasions for issues to be raised by back-benchers or crossbenchers, and the choice of subject is made by ballot. The purpose of each short debate is to allow peers to discuss a particular topic rather than to come to a conclusion about it. Topics discussed tend to be non-partisan and the range is broad. Thus, for example, in January 1993, the Viscount of Oxford initiated a debate on the pollution of city centres by road traffic and Lord Pearson of Rannoch initiated one on government policies on the recruitment and training of those entrusted with the residential care of children. Both motions provided the opportunity for interested peers to offer their views and for ministers to explain the governments position and to reveal what proposals were under consideration by the relevant department.
| Questions. |
Questions in the Lords are of two types: starred and unstarred. The meanings are different to those employed in the Commons. In the Commons, starred questions are oral questions and unstarred questions ate written questions. In the Lords, starred questions are non-debatable questions and unstarred questions are questions on which a short debate may take place. At the beginning of each day's sitting, up to four "starred" questions may be asked. These are similar to those tabled for oral answer in the Commons, though - unlike in the Commons - they are addressed to Her Majesty's Government and not to a particular minister. At the end of the day's sitting, there is also usually an "unstarred" question: i.e. one which may be debated.
The advantages of such unstarred questions are similar to those of the half-hour adjournment debates in the Commons, except that in this case there is a much greater opportunity for other members to participate. For example, when the Earl of Perth on 28 January 1993 asked what action the government proposed o take on the devastation in Perthshire caused by he River Tay, no fewer than seven peers spoke - in addition to Lord Perth - before the minister rose to reply. The debate lasted more than one-and-a-quarter hours.
| Committees. |
.though the House remains a chamber-oriented institution, it has made greater use in recent years of committees. Apart from a number of established committees dealing, for example, with privilege and the judicial function of the House, it has variously made use of ad hoc Select Committees, appointed to consider the desirability of certain legislative measures. A number have been appointed to consider issues of public policy. The House has also made use of its power to create sessional select committees, i.e. committees appointed regularly tom session to session rather than for the purpose if one particular inquiry. Two of these committees have reputations as high-powered committees of scrutiny:
| The European Union Committee. |
This undertakes scrutiny of draft European legislation and has six subcommittees. The subcommittees prepare reports for the House and recommend whether there should be a debate. The Committee has developed a formidable reputation and is respected both by the Commons and within the European Union.
| The Select Committee on Science and Technology. |
The remit of this committee is wide and its inquiries have covered a broad range. The committee is essentially non-partisan in approach and benefits from a number of peers with an expertise in the subject. In 1988 89, for example, its members - both appointed and coopted - included a professor of cell physiology, five engineers, a former professor of physics, a professor of pharmacology, and the chairman of the University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology. Between 1979 and 1991, the committee carried out thirty-four principal inquiries, covering topics such as science and government, hazardous waste disposal, space policy, the greenhouse effect, and systematic biology research. The committee has raised issues which otherwise might have been neglected by government - and certainly not considered in any depth by the Commons - and a number of its reports have proved influential.
These committees are supplemented now by a Delegated Powers and Deregulation Scrutiny Committee, which looks at whether powers of delegated legislation in a Bill are appropriate and makes recommendations to the House. These permanent committees are variously supplemented by ad hoc committees, appointed to consider particular issues. In 1995, for example, the House appointed a Committee on Relations Between Central and Local Government.
The use of committees thus constitutes a modest but valuable supplement to the work undertaken on the floor of the House. They allow the House to specialise to some degree and to draw on the expertise of its membership, an expertise that cannot be matched by the elected House of Commons. They also fulfil an important expressive function. The Committees take evidence from interested bodies - the submission of written evidence is extensive - thus allowing groups an opportunity to get their views on the public record.
| Party meetings. |
The parties in the Lords are organised, with their own leaders and whips. Even the cross-benchers, have their own elected leader and circulate a whip. However, neither the Conservative nor the Labour Party in the Lords has a committee structure. Instead, peers are able to attend the Commons' back-bench committees and a number do so. Any attempt at influence through the party structure in the Lords, therefore, takes the form of talking to the whips or of raising the issue at the weekly party meeting.
The Conservative Party, not surprisingly given its strength among peers, has the better attended meetings. The Association of Conservative Peers (the ACP) meets at 2.15 on a Thursday afternoon. The occasion is used to discuss a particular issue or (in government) to listen to a minister. If a government Bill is coming up for its second reading in the House, the relevant Cabinet minister will usually attend, often accompanied by the junior minister responsible for the day-to-day handling of the Bill.
Party meetings are useful as two-way channels of communication between leaders and led in the Lords and, in a wider context, between a party's supporters in the Lords and the leadership of the whole party. Given the problems of ensuring structured and regular contact between whips and their party's peers, the party meetings provide a useful means of gauging the mood of the regular attenders.

THE HOUSE OF LORDS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
From the 1970s, Peers became
more active: they began to attend in greater numbers, sit for more days and spend more time on each day's sitting.Peers also became
more independent in their voting behaviour; from 1974 - 1979, the government was defeated 347 times in the Lords. Given the Conservative dominance in the House, this is explicable in party terms. What is surprising is the number of defeats imposed on Conservative governments since 1970.From 1979 - 1997 the government was defeated more than 200 times. A typical session would witness ten or more defeats.
Some of the defeats were on important or
politically contentious issues, and took place on a broad range of Bills e.g. In 1990 the government was defeated in its attempt to introduce student loans.The extent of the defeats became such that the government's business managers became more inclined to anticipate reaction in the Lords before proceeding with measures.
Ironically, as a result of the Lords' greater independence, going against the wishes of the government more often than the elected House, the House of Lords at times has appeared
more responsive to public disquiet and has become a target for lobbying by pressure groups.As such, it has been become
more significant as a chamber for expressing the views of different groups in society, offering an outlet for views that sometimes fail to find an outlet in the lower House.The reasons for this significant behavioural change have been identified by Nicholas Baldwin as twofold:
a combination of an influx of life peers and a change of attitude.Two further developments may also have contributed to the change. One was the nature of the government returned in 1979. Although a Conservative government, it pursued radical neo-liberal policies that were not always liked by Conservative peers.
"Thatcherism" was not in the ascendancy among Conservative peers and the government was not able to wield any sanctions that would force peers to support it.The introduction of
television cameras may also have served to reinforce peers' willingness to be involved in the affairs of the House, though the initial novelty has worn off. The House was given a greater public visibility - especially in the four years before the proceedings of the Commons were televised - thus providing a more attractive platform for peers with a point to make.

Handout 3/15
THE HOUSE OF LORDS: PRESSURE FOR CHANGE
Although the Lords has changed in recent decades, it still seems that it is occupied by long since dead Peers and people who once wrote a catchy ditty or two. Demands continue to be made for it to be further reformed or even abolished. Critics contend that there is no case for maintaining a legislative chamber in which the composition is determined predominantly by an accident of birth. It is not a representative chamber by any definition of the term (other, arguably, than in a symbolic sense, representing entrenched wealth and privilege) and therefore, it is argued, has no legitimacy to challenge the decisions of the elected House of Commons. Furthermore, critics contend that the upper House is not such an effective chamber for scrutinising and influencing government as its defenders claim. The government can usually employ its majority in the Commons to reverse a defeat in the Lords. Where it agrees to change a measure in the face of pressure from the Lords, the change is often cosmetic rather than substantive. And on vital issues, the Conservatives can bring in those peers who do not normally attend but will come when urgently pressed to do so. These "backwoodsmen" are brought in on rare occasions (and often on life-support machines) under Conservative governments to overcome opposition on contentious issues, most notably in recent years on the "Poll Tax" in 1988 and the issue of a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1993; after which they then resumed life in their coffins). Under a Labour government, the threat of being overwhelmed by Conservative peers is ever-present in 1998 the Government was defeated on the Competition Bill designed to allow a free-market in newspaper pricing. Critics therefore press for reform, even abolition, of the upper House.
Demands for reform are nothing new. As the democratic principle became more widely accepted in the nineteenth century, so calls for the reform of the unelected House of Lords became more strident. Conservative obstruction of Liberal Bills in the 1880s led the Liberal Lord Morley (the Mandelson of his time) to demand that the upper House "mend or end", an approach adopted as Liberal policy in 1891. In 1894, the Liberal conference voted in favour of abolishing the Lords' power of veto. When the Lords rejected the Budget of the Liberal government in 1909, the government introduced the Parliament Bill. Passed in 1911, the preamble envisaged an elected House. Schemes of reform have peppered the decades since. They have not been confined to politicians of the left. Various Conservatives have advocated change and it was a Conservative government that was responsible for the Life Peerages Act in 1958 and the Peerages Act - allowing peers to renounce their titles - in 1963.
However, the more radical demands for change have generally emanated from Labour politicians. In 1969, the Parliament (No.2) Bill, introduced by the Labour government of Harold Wilson, sought to phase out the hereditary element. The Bill foundered after encountering opposition from Conservative MPs, led by Enoch Powell, who felt it went too far, and from Labour MPs, led by Michael Foot, who believed it did not go far enough. In 1983, the Labour Party manifesto committed the party to abolition of the upper House. In 1997, Blair advocated two-stage reform: first, the elimination of the hereditary element and, second and in a later Parliament, the introduction of an elected second chamber. The Liberal Democrats also favour a reformed second chamber - a senate - as part of a wider package of constitutional reform. What then are the arguments put forward for each of the proposals?
| Retain. |
This approach favours leaving the House alone. The House, it is argued, does a good job. It complements the elected House and provides a degree of detached expertise that would be lost if the House was elected. Furthermore, the hereditary element provides members who are beholden to no one and can make judgements independent of vested interests. They can also raise important issues which elected politicians may be reluctant to raise. If the House was elected, it would have the same claim to democratic legitimacy as the Commons and would either be the same as the Commons - thus constituting a rubber-stamping body and achieving nothing - or, if elected by a different method or at different times, would have the potential to clash with the Commons and create stalemate in the political system.
Defenders of the present House also point out that there is no strong demand for reform among citizens. The debate takes place principally at an elite, not a mass, level. As reformers cannot agree among themselves on what reform to support, the House is likely to remain as it is - and defenders would like it to stay that way.
| Reform. |
This approach favours a reform to the existing House, retaining its present strengths in terms of expertise and work as a revising chamber while getting rid of the hereditary basis of its membership. This approach was embodied in the 1969 Parliament (No.2) Bill, which provided for voting peers and non-voting peers. Those peers who had succeeded to their titles were to retain their right to sit in the House but not to vote, and the right to sit was not to pass to their successors. Hereditary peers would thus be phased out, leaving a chamber based on the principle of appointment. The fact that the House was appointed rather than elected would mean that it would lack the legitimacy to challenge the elected House. It would thus retain its existing powers and continue to complement, and not compete with, the Commons. Furthermore, as an appointed chamber it would not be unique, an appointed second chamber being a feature of several legislatures, including, for example, the Canadian federal parliament.
| Replace. |
This approach favours doing away with the House of Lords and replacing it with a new second chamber. Several reformers favour an elected second chamber. Election, it is contended, would give the House a legitimacy which it presently lacks. That greater legitimacy would allow the House to serve as a more effective check on government, knowing that it was not open to accusations of being undemocratic. If members were elected on a national and regional basis, this - it is argued -would allow the different parts of the UK to have a more distinct voice in the political process.
Others who favour doing away with the House of Lords want to replace it not with an elected chamber but with a chamber composed of representatives of different organised interests - a functional chamber. This, it is claimed, would ensure that the different groups in society - trade unions, charities, industry, consumer bodies - had a direct input into the political process, instead of having to lobby MPs and peers in the hope of getting a hearing. The problem with this proposal is that it would prove difficult to agree on which groups should enjoy representation in the House. Defenders of the existing House point out that, in reality, there is extensive functional representation in any event, with leading figures in a great many groups having been dispatched to the Lords.
| Remove altogether. |
Under this approach, the House of Lords would be abolished and not replaced at all. Instead, the UK would have a unicameral legislature, the legislative burden being shouldered by a reformed House of Commons. Supporters of this approach argue that there is no case for an unelected second chamber, since it has no legitimacy to challenge an elected chamber, and that there is no case for an elected second chamber, since this would result in either imitation or conflict. Parliament should therefore constitute a single chamber, like legislatures in Scandinavia and New Zealand. The House of Commons should be reformed in order that it may fulfil all the functions presently carried out by the two chambers.
Opponents of this approach argue that a single chamber would not be able to carry the burden, not least given the volume of public business in a country with a population of 57 million, many times larger than New Zealand and the Scandinavian countries with unicameral legislatures. Furthermore, they contend, the House of Commons could not fulfil the task of a constitutional safeguard, since it would essentially be acting as a safeguard against itself. Nor would it be an appropriate body to undertake a second look at legislation since it would not be able to bring to bear a different point of view and different experience to that brought to bear the first time round.
In considering aspects of reform, note that questions are increasingly being asked not just about reform of the House of Lords specifically, but about the implications of an elected Second Chamber whatever form it might take. You should therefore note the following points:
| If elected, a second chamber would have to be given greater powers and a defined role because it will have democratic legitimacy. | |
| If elected, a second chamber could become a challenger to the primacy of the Commons and this could result in either conflict or stalemate. | |
| Depending on the composition of the chambers, the second chamber could become a total block upon the first, especially if it has fixed-date elections and those elections are held in a period of unpopularity for the dominant party in the Commons. | |
| If an elected second chamber were created, it may develop expertise in areas which might further reduce the primacy of the Commons. |

DOES BRITAIN NEED A SECOND CHAMBER?
SUGGESTED ANSWER.