This is a version of :
On the role of critics in the culture industry, Journal of
Cultural Economics 19 321-331 1995
TOWARDS AN ECONOMICS OF ARTS CRITICISM
"I am bound by my own definition of criticism: a disinterested
endeavour to learn and propagate the best that is known and
thought in the world"
Matthew Arnold, Functions of Criticism at the Present Time
"The good critic is he who relates the adventures of his soul
among masterpieces"
Anatole France, The Literary Life preface
"..every critic is young until he is forty"
Neville Cardus Autobiography p.253
I.Introduction.
II.Do Critics Influence Demand?: Empirical Evidence.
III. The Role of the Critic.
IV. Taste Endogeneity.
V. Critics Behaviour.
VI. Conclusion.
Appendix
I.INTRODUCTION.
In this paper we consider the role of criticism in the arts
(and entertainment) from an economic point of view. The
fundamental economic notion of criticism (like advertising)
is as a source of information. The existence of such a mechanism
for information dispersal raises questions about the efficiency
of the market to which it relates. Various difficulties in
defining and achieving efficiency are highlighted throughout the
paper. The paper concludes with an appendix on the recorded
classical music market in the U.K. which highlights the issues
discussed.
The subject of arts criticism is neglected to an
astonishing degree in cultural economics. John Ruskin, in his
Political Economy of Art, gave quite detailed consideration of
accumulation and distribution of works of art but no attention at
all to criticism despite the fact that a large part of his
oeuvre concerned the cultivation of other people's taste.
MOSSETTO[1992] discusses unresolved issues in the economic arts
in the history of thought but makes no reference to the role of
criticism. Notwithstanding a substantial amount of research on
economic issues in the arts, since the late 1960's, there has
been no change. Indeed the nearest thing to a textbook on
cultural economics, THROSBY and WITHERS [1979] mentions critics
only twice and provides no analysis of criticism. A number of
hypotheses explain this state of affairs immediately spring to
mind. Firstly there may be no need for such an analysis as it is
so obvious and trivial in terms of economics. This is obviously
something the reader will have to judge. At the opposite extreme
it may be that the area is so difficult to get hold of that the
utility maximizing economist may seek easier publications
elsewhere. In between these views we might argue that market
failure in the choice of topics has arisen because of
ossification of the field into established topics such as cost
functions of arts organizations and the case for government
subsidy. Given that this paper exists, we must be inclined to the
middle view. The neglect of the sub-field makes it difficult to
provide an entirely coherent view as there is no direct
discussion from previous thinkers to draw upon. Hence, this paper
is organised around a number of topics which mostly illustrate
the tension between the subject area and standard microeconomics.
The appearance of criticism is intrinsically bound up with
the transformation of cultural activity into the capitalist
commodity form. This can be illustrated by the example of
peasant poetry in the form of the Russian dirge (see
Langer[1953]) p.276 fn.14]. The dirges were extemporized by women
on behalf of their dead according to strict rules of form and
structure. Each dirge was a completely new poem with no attempt
being made to save the best. Thus there were rules of production
but no possibility of criticism as there was no circulation of
the product. With the development of recording technology the
field of performing arts broadens into sound and picture
reproductions of the original work i.e. we could now buy a CD of
peasant dirges. Sound and image recordings could therefore serve
the same functions as sculptures and paintings i.e. the may be a
store of value, a source of speculative investment or an item of
conspicuous consumption.
If cultural products are to circulate criticism can play a
role in determining market size through information provision and
taste formation. Admittedly some markets can emerge independently
of critical awareness but their subsequent development will be
influenced by the presence of criticism. If one argues that
criticism is totally irrelevant to consumer choice then it would
appear that it has no economic function and should therefore be
abolished as a deadweight loss. This paper seeks to explore the
opposite position.
II. DO CRITICS INFLUENCE DEMAND: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ?
Conventional demand theory lays great stress on price as
the major determinant of choice. In an area of great uncertainty
over product characteristics small variations of price are likely
to be of little significance. With cultural products individuals
are faced with a wide range of items which they could afford to
consume given constraints of other prices and income. In
marketing terms their resistance is based on not knowing enough
about the product rather than price. Criticism is a potential
source of influence on consumer resistance to the market because
it provides information on product characteristics.
The literature on determinants of demand for different
types of cultural output, at the aggregate level, has established
that the most important factor is participation in consumption or
production of the cultural activity at an early age (see e.g.
Morrison & West [1986]). Relatively little is known about what
determines the success of an item of cultural output compared
with another of the same type. In the case of films it has been
found by SIMONET[1980] and SMITH AND SMITH[1986] that the
presence of stars or specific directors are not good predictors
of success. SMITH and SMITH find that total 'Oscars' accruing to
a film have a significant positive effect on revenues BUT many of
the individual awards have a significant negative impact.
TAYLOR[1974] finds that the number of Oscars and the opinion of
New York film critics have significant positive effects on the
television audience for films. The influence of Broadway critics
is widely believed to be enormous yet there is no test of this
hypothesis in the published studies of Broadway performances by
MOORE[1968] and KELEJIAN and LAWRENCE [1980]. Some support is
found in a more recent study by HIRSCHMAN and PIEROS[1985] who
find that a positive review may have a negative impact on
attendance. This may indicate a rational use of critics
judgements as a favourable review may be seen as revelation of
elitist preferences.
There is clearly scope for empirical work assessing the
impact of critics on demand particularly in the case of recorded
performances where there are many guidebooks which provide star
ratings of performances.
The Role of Prizes
The measured influence of critics may be greater than it,
at first, appears because it is diffuse and difficult to
quantify. The prospective consumer can not easily maximize
utility in the face of costly, uncertain information. One way of
satisficing is through the development of institutions which
award seals of approval such as literary prizes. Although
economists have paid much attention to prizes in the labour
market literature on tournaments (see e.g. GIFFORD and KENNEY
[1986]), there has been no analysis of the role of prizes in
consumer markets. The ranking in labour market contests is not
used to adjust each entrant to their marginal product. Rather the
contest shifts up all marginal productivity schedules in pursuit
of the prize. Cultural contests are aimed at consumption. The
intention is to produce an upward shift in all demand schedules
through attracting potential consumers of prize nominees into
book vendors. 'Beauty competitions' provide an intense focus on a
small subset of product. They are of greatest help to consumers
who are not regular consumers in the particular cultural
sub-market as such people face the greatest degree of
uncertainty in decision-making. The problem of selling to a
non-specialist consumer facilitate the creation of superstars
[ROSEN(1985)] in the arts. The use of prizes is a sub-set of the
superstar phenomenon of a profound skew of market share towards a
small number of performers.
III. THE ROLE OF THE CRITIC.
III.(i). Agency
Firstly, there is a a pure 'agency' function of supplying
information to sovereign consumers. The critic has a simple
function of achieving economies of scale in the dissemination of
information. The central issue in agency theory is that of
finding incentives which will induce agents to "behave exactly as
the principal would if the principal shared the agents' skills
and knowledge" SAPPINGTON [1991,p.46].On the basis of agency
theory we can envisage demand (consumer) and supply(producer)
side rationales for the existence of a criticism industry.
On the supply side we should distinguish between the needs
of the creators and marketers/distributers of the product. The
creative artist might welcome the views of the critic as a
sounding board over the direction of their own oeuvre which may
be shrouded in doubt. In some cases, e.g. book publishers and
dramatic agents, this function is usually internalised by a long
run relationship between editor/agent and author. A recent paper
by KAUN[1991] suggests that neither the praise of critics or
consumers bring any utility to the unremittingly miserable life
of the author although they may do so to other types of creative
artists.
For distributers it is usual to claim that their product
is an excellent experience. If United Artists have bills posted
claiming that X is 'the most important film of the decade' then
it would seem that it is the duty of all to go and see it but the
logical response is 'they would say that wouldn't they'. To have
any credibility advertising must contain information from a
source which is perceived as independent of the producers. Thus,
independence from the production process means that critics can
serve an agency function for the producers. Without designated
critics advertising would have to be discounted as mere puffery.
Reviews can be used to provide third party appraisals for
inclusion in publicity material.
A rare neo-classical treatment by KELEJIAN and LAWRENCE
[1980] of critics sees them as being purely the agents of
potential audiences. The potential arts consumer's ideal is a
critic to tell them what level of utility they would obtain if
they had gone to an arts event (given their current fixed,
exogenously given preference structure). If utilities were
comparable then time could be optimally allocated between all
possible consumption events. Given the difficulty of utility
comparisons, consumers will use criticism as a proxy; reading the
same critic persistently allows revelation of the congruity
between reader and writer preferences. If the psychological
literature, on personality and enjoyment of culture (CATTELL[1967
p.143-145]), were taken seriously this could be formalised
if appropriate psychometric tests were used. Suppose a particular
type of music is favoured by someone with high scores on say
introversion and obsessiveness. If critics took personality tests
and these were published then an individual who undergoes the
same tests could enhance the efficiency with which they match
themselves to products.
Typically criticism is jointly supplied with other
things in a newspaper or magazine e.g. it is supplied at zero
marginal production cost to the consumer. A magazine which has an
identifiable cultural stance is likely to employ critics with
similar preferences. A corporate critical identity is an
instance of the use of reputation as a signal of product quality.
Reputation imparts public good characteristics to critical
output. That is, people who have not read Mr.X or publication
Y's review may be persuaded by heresay reports of its
favourability or otherwise. The advantage of this is that
criticism is cross-subsidised with attendant benefits to the
culture market. Given that zero priced criticism is of benefit to
the culture industry there would seem to be gains to the culture
industry of subsidising critical publications in some way which
does not undermine their credibility. The main obstacle is the
difficulty of capturing the gains as many of these would go to
rivals. This problem will diminish as the degree of
monopolization of a market segment increases. Examples of this
can be found in the music and print industries where a small
number of retail distributors have considerable market power.
These issue magazines, covering all forms of music, which look
like independent productions but never contain any negative views
on the artists/works covered. The charade is maintained through
the occasional appearance of a price on the front cover which no
one ever pays. In its simplest form the division of labour
argument implies that the critic is just another sort of consumer
journalist i.e. they 'know what to look for'. They may be better
at knowing what to look for because they have specialised in
viewing cultural products and/or have relevant human capital not
possessed by consumers.
III.(ii) 'Voice'
In HIRSCHMANN's [1970] view consumer sovereignty operates
either through 'exit' where dissatisfaction with a product
results in substitution to a different one or 'voice' where
consumers communicate the changes they wish for to the producers.
In the arts the critic may serve to articulate the voice of the
consumers. If a creative person changed their style it might
still lead to purchases by loyal consumers hence there would be
no indication of exit until disappointment began to affect future
products.
III.(iii) Critique as a consumption good.
Outside the purely academic arena we find items of
criticism to be generally brief and of high information content.
Thus as it takes much less time to read a book review than it
does to read a book the ex ante optimum might involve lots of
review reading and no book reading. I choose books here because
it provides the most extreme case of disparity in time intensity
but obviously the same argument applies to other products. The
'full price' BECKER[1965] of consuming a critique is much lower
than that of consuming culture itself. Thus criticism can prove
to be a substitute to cultural consumption rather than a
complement. Reviews may function as consumption goods rather than
inputs for someone who wants to appear knowledgable about an art
form without the bother of direct consumption or the reviews
themselves may provide utility independently of the item
reviewed. The former case implies conspicuous consumption where
being seen to have a high level of cultural intake is more
important than actually having done so. The quote from ANATOLE
FRANCE, at the head of this paper, implies that the critic should
inspire the reader to want to share his/her rapture. This
approach would head off the first consumption element to some
extent as the pure information content would be low. The second
element may seem implausible in some cases; it seems unlikely
that there are many people who would find opera reviews
interesting if they have no knowledge of the opera. There are
counter examples notably in the theatre criticism of JAMES AGATE
which was reputedly written before he attended the performance.
His intention was purely to entertain readers rather than promote
their cultural consumption.
III.(iv). Non-Standard Consumer Behaviour.
Satisficing and the Marginal Consumer
In standard demand theory consumers are usually only seen
as being on the margin of choice in the sense that they know for
sure what they want and move across the margin only as price or
income variables change. We have alluded above to the non-expert
or non-regular purchaser who might be deemed a 'marginal consumer'
in a different sense. Take the example of someone who wants to
buy a present for a book lover. If the donor simply asks the
preferences of the recipient and carries them out they are an
agent involved in redistribution. If preferences are not elicited
the individual must make inferences from studying revealed
preferences but this may be prohibitively costly. Consultation of
expert opinion in the form of critics' evaluation is likely to
prove more efficient. The purchaser here is also marginal in the
sense that there is little involvement of their own personality
in the consumption of the good. Such marginality may also arise
if cultural purchases are inputs to some other good in time
allocation theory [BECKER(1965)] such as 'a good evening out'. In
such a case the consumer may be indifferent as to which play,
film, etc. they will view so long as whatever is chosen crosses
some threshold level. The cultural product could even be
displaced by some other item such as a sports event. The same
principle will apply to other items such as restaurants which are
complementary inputs to the ultimate good. The role of criticism
here is still of an agency type.
Producer reputation has greatest significance to the
marginal cultural consumer who may see such consumption as a
joint product in some overall package. A marginal customer faced
with uncertain and difficult to assess products which are
appraised by criticism which they find it equally difficult to
assess may simply give up attempting to choose via an agent. The
corollary of this is to give up and consume a product of lower
quality variance or fall back on a rule of thumb such as
reputation. For example, tourists seem to consume London plays in
such a way;reputation capital is very important in financial
terms for the London theatres GAPINSKI[1988]. Critics have a role
as creators and monitors of reputation. Reputation may adhere to
a product category through accumulated critical acclaim i.e. it
is a form of capital due to past criticism. Many people harbour
the vague idea that works by certain producers are of high
cultural merit although they have no direct experience of them.
In the work of ROSEN[1985] such producers are 'superstars' (see
also ADLER[1985], TOWSE [1991]) who earn abnormally high returns
which can not be explained by conventional economic reasoning. In
the arts 'firms' can appropriate high prestige superstar brand
names at zero cost! The most blatant example is Shakespeare.
Hierarchial Preferences
The above considers consumers without reference to a
hierarchy of preferences i.e. cultural goods are seen as engines
for the production of utility no different from vegetables or
drinks. This conflicts with traditional thinking in the
philosophy of art such as LANGER[1953,p.28] who says:
"An enlightened society usually has some means,public or private,
to support its artists,because their work is regarded as a
spiritual triumph and a claim to greatness for the whole tribe.
But mere epicures would hardly achieve such fame. Even
chefs,perfumers, and upholsterers, who produce the means of
sensory pleasure for others, are not rated as the torchbearers of
culture and inspired creators."
Until very recently the notion of a hierarchy in the arts,
where the work of Keats was worth more than that of Bob Dylan,
was the accepted policy of the Arts Council of Great Britain.
Their stated policy is now closer to the position of orthodox
economics which has no place for tenets of criticism based on
different orders of satisfaction. The traditional model of choice
rules out judgmental ordering of the arguments of the utility
function. If we relax the requirement of homogeneous
substitutability between sources of utility then individuals have
meta-preferences i.e. preferences about preferences. Some,such as
SHEFRIN and THALER[1981], SCHELLING [1984] assume that
individuals have 'higher' preferences which lead them to seek
'utility enhancing consumption constraints' LEVY[1988],additional
to incomes and market prices to control the drive to satisfy
lower order preferences. In the case of cultural consumption you
may find yourself watching films or television which you perceive
as 'trashy' when you feel you ought to be doing something of
higher cultural value; this is perceived as a lapse of will power
COOTER[1991].
This is still a fundamentally utilitarian model
McCAIN [1990] with exogenously given tastes and a well-defined,
albeit more complex utility function. Cultural consumption takes
place in a high uncertainty environment. In a neo-classical model
the uncertainty is transmuted into risk with known probability
distributions. Hence, the subjective expected utility (SEU)
approach can provide predictions from a Von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function. This could be married to the multiple utility
model without fear of internal contradiction. However there are
other facets of uncertainty highlighted in the psychological
literature which might influence the efficiency of the critical
market. Individuals, in situations of uncertainty, strive to
preserve a good self image. Research on cognitive dissonance
indicates that people improve their rating of something once it
comes into their possession because of this GILAD et al.[1987].
In the case of the arts they do not want to see themselves as a
fool who just sat through their fifth successive dreadful play.
Attendance at cultural events is a means of affirming one's
identity. There is thus pre-commitment to a favourable attitude
to something which one has put time and money into. Attending a
cultural event says something about the type of person one wishes
to be seen as. Critics may therefore function as leaders of
opinion and fashion. This leads us into the subject of taste
endogeneity.
IV. TASTE ENDOGENEITY.
Critics have a potentially important role in taste
formation. One might argue that critics are the guardians of
aesthetic values. Aesthetics involves some absolute notions of
what is 'good' and 'bad' in art and culture. It is not necessary
to enter into aesthetic discourse in this paper as the only
values of interest in an economic analysis are those of the
ultimate consumers which would be used to rank alternative social
states in terms of social welfare.
The behaviour of critics is premised on taste endogeneity
particularly through the 'cultivation' of taste McCAIN[1986]. If
one has not cultivated a taste for opera then opera criticism is
totally irrelevant. If sufficient appreciation capital ([BECKER &
STIGLER[1977],VILLANI[1992]) is not present then art forms which
require an ability to comprehend them may cease to exist.
Individuals will only invest in appreciation capital if the net
discounted lifetime gain from developing the new set of
preferences has to be positive. Rent seeking activity by
supporters of the art form, which may include critics, could
capture government subsidies to maintain the market. Rent seeking
in this area could involve an attempt to mould audience
preferences to a particular pattern. The social pressure
required for this is initiated and/or maintained by critical
output.
In a world of perfect information the above collapses to a
simple short-run/long-run distinction. In the long run everyone
would have adjusted to their optimal stocks of appreciation
capital for all arts hence all culture markets would be optimal
(assuming no outside market failure). In terms of dual preference
models the meta preferences are the long run preferences (unless
the costs of adjustment are prohibitive) and all conflict between
act and will is resolved. The agency role of critics here is that
they search over the set of tastes that may be worth cultivating
on behalf of the consumers and hence speed the transition to the
long run equilibrium. A full information treatment is paradoxical
to some extent as striving to change one's tastes suggests a
problem of uncertainty that can not be transmuted into risk with
known probability distributions. It is a dubious practice to
analyse changing tastes in the same way that we analyse changing
quantities in response to prices with given tastes. The
Becker-Stigler approach implies tastes which are changing in a
given way i.e. we know what tastes we could have (and more
importantly the utility they would provide) even before we have
cultivated them. With pervasive uncertainty, it is difficult to
know what one's tastes really are. With the intervention of
critics, tastes are not simply knowing what you like but also
justification of your likes and dislikes. Justification of
behaviour is omitted from conventional economic analysis. As
COOTER[1991,p.159], writing on the economics of law says:
"Economics must overcome the prejudice that behaviour is real but
thoughts are not. The standard model of decision making must be
expanded to encompass the doubts, hesitations, conflicts, and
regrets that afflict us."
As indicated in section III the expression of a preference
for cultural output may resolve doubts, hesitations and conflicts
through affirming identity. A critic may aid in this through
setting the tone for a social (reference) group to which an
individual aspires.
Originality
If originality is an argument in the utility function of
the consumer then a case can be made for the necessity of an
agent to validate the originality of the consumption experience.
We can distinguish between relative and absolute originality. If
I am simply inadequately informed about relevant antecedents then
I might be impressed by an item which is not absolutely original.
If it is relative originality which appears in the utility
function there may be no need for a critic. A critic is obviously
needed if absolute originality features in the utility function
as the authenticity of a work's claim to originality must be
checked out by an expert.
There are two relevant notions of originality here being
the idea of innovation or invention and the physical
manifestation of the first instance of a cultural product.
In the latter case value can be extremely high because there can
only be one genuine physical original. The market value
ultimately depends on critical appraisal of the original concept
embodied in the piece.
In a neo-classical approach it is hard to see why
absolutely innovative/inventive concepts should matter to the
consumer. If the object of cultural activity is utility
maximization then what would be wrong in laughing at 300 year old
jokes or enjoying pastiches of grand master paintings on modern
subjects? We might follow SCITOVSKY[1976] by assuming that
utility is derived from variety. Following the LANCASTER[1971]
theory of consumer demand variety could be derived without
originality simply through sampling a wide range of existing
characteristics. But, originality must connote a new
characteristic not simply a new product made up of old
characteristics. Originality breaks up the old pattern of demand.
It bifurcates the flow of new products; some pass the test of
being genuinely new whilst others fail. Consequently rents arise
for the bearers of originality. Critical recognition of their
originality effectively patents their contribution. Merely
imitative copying of the original concept is critically
denigrated and thus results in a much lower market value. For
example mimicking Warhol's soup can work with a different product
such as sauce bottles would be, even for the physical original,
relegated to the status of poster art. This has happened to the
work of Magritte which is now routinely imitated in commercial
art e.g the cover of SACKS' 'The Man Who Mistook his Wife for a
Hat [1985] or the CD booklet of the 1991 album 'Prodigal
Stranger' by Procol Harum. This is an example of 'Rubbish Theory'
[THOMPSON(1979)] where art objects pass through a period of low
market value (no recognition) then high value and back to low
value again.
The implicit critical patent of originality may be
exploited by dealers and artists through a deliberate restriction
of output (see SINGER[1988]). Originality where something new is
done to no meaningful end other than the novelty may be deemed
'useless originality' (2). Consumers thus run the risk of being
sold a lemon by the critics. If we are seeking guidance on how to
develop our tastes and originality is a sought after virtue then
we might find ourselves sitting through a play or looking at a
painting which is the equivalent of a chocolate tea-pot (highly
original but not much use). It might seem that a lexicographic
form of assessment could be used to circumvent the useless
originality problem. This is limited by the very nature of
originality. Aspects of a work of culture which are seen, by the
majority, as ridiculous when it is first produced may come to be
seen as breathakingly beautiful or insightful when the decoding
of the work has been popularised. The reverse may also happen. In
other words, the utility function may shift in response to
critical fashion. To be more precise; if we are working in terms
of a dual preference model, the lower order preferences may be
unchanging but the higher order preferences may be endogenous to
critical opinion.
The above may cease to be true if post-modernism enters the
mainstream of critical thinking. In some areas, e.g. some visual
arts and dance music constructed from samples of old records
critics praise the ironic juxtaposition and recycling of source
materials. In literature the importance of the author is
downplayed in favour of interpretation of the text as an entity
in its own right. Such thinking will tend to erode the status of
originality. Hence originality in the sense of something entirely
new is seen as a naive holy grail. The death of the author in
modern visual art is neatly illustrated in the following passage
"Artists don't make art any more they produce it. The language of
the market is as visible in criticism as it is in the work.
Artist MARK KOSTABI boasts that he has separate assistants to
think up ideas,paint his canvasses and talk to the press:
'Ultimately, I would like to walk into a major museum like the
modern or the Met (...) and see a painting or two with my
signature on it but that I've never seen before' " .
HESS[1988,p.13].
Having considered the demand side rationale for criticism
we now turn to the topic of critics themselves.
V. CRITICS' BEHAVIOUR
In the subjective expected utility model (e.g.
ABBE-DECARROUX[1991]) an unsatisfactory consumption experience
would simply be an ex post realization of low product quality in
an uncertain world. . Unsatisfactory consumption could be reduced
to a simple 'lemon' problem a la AKERLOF[1970] as applied to
works of art by McCAIN[1980]. The question that has to be asked
is do critics have an incentive to shift lemons?
Taking a standard economic approach we assume that critics
are utility mximizers whose conduct will be influenced by
constraints of the market in which they operate. The utility
function of the critic will contain pecuniary rewards plus
non-pecuniary returns from prestige and status. The latter may
contribute to the former e.g. a very well known critic could
become wealthy from writing a guide book or presenting a
television show. If the market for critics was perfectly
competitive and tastes were exogenous then differential returns
would represent returns to unique critical abilities i.e. a
special gift for inferring what other people will like (or ought
to like in a metapreference approach). The self-interest of
critics will lead to erosion of perfect competition from erection
of entry barriers to the profession. This is accomplished via
consensus on a body of knowledge which is part of the critical
repertoire. Reviewers of films, for example, may make extensive
reference to the position of a work in a canon of pieces. This
may contribute very little in the way of effective agency to the
typical consumer. It does however serve to remind the consumer
that they know less and therefore need the expert. Of course,
there is the possibility alluded to above that the consumer can
plagiarise the critical output in order to impress a less
informed social circle.
Critics will also seek to regulate the production of
reputation. As indicated above they participate in its creation.
Reputation may also develop from hearsay and attain a mythic
status beyond the reach of the critic which threatens the
occupation. The notion of Shakespeare as a genius is unassailable
in the popular imagination, HUDSON [1967,p.80] finds very few
schoolboys willing to doubt his position despite their limited
experience in drama or its criticism. A dramatist may become
unassailable but the critic could still serve as a monitor of the
quality of productions. This function will be eroded if the
production company attains a sufficient reputation. We have
productions by the English Shakespeare Company and the Royal
Shakespeare company which, however good they may be, have not
been through any form of validation to carry a name of such
iconic power.
Rent-seeking by critics may lead to a supply of biased
critical information hence a significant departure from ideal
agency behaviour. There are obviously potential rents to
producers who can capture critics (assuming that critics
influence revenues). There are mechanisms which could prevent
critical bias. Consumers could reduce risk through holding a
portfolio of reviews of the event which interests them. This
might involve buying five newspapers which is not an arduous
task. Pooling of critical information could be taken further by
'review of reviews' publications. This involves a super agent
interposing themselves between the uncoordinated agents. There
seem to be very few reviews of reviews available. This may
indicate a case of market failure or a lack of consumer interest
in reviews.
Free access to cultural products for critics would appear
to be an institution which might be of detriment to the final
consumer. There are two reasons to let critics in free: (i) to
curry favour (ii) to increase the probability of a review
appearing. Producer rents from this will be eroded through
competition between promoters of cultural products i.e. when all
critics do not pay the only way to get any further leverage would
be to reduce the price below zero i.e. offer a 'bribe'. If
critics were being bribed this would destroy the credibility of
the criticism market. It might be felt that promotional parties
etc. constitute near bribes but competition here would again
eliminate any advantage. In any case it is difficult for a
bribing producer to bind critics to an agreement to support them.
They have few sanctions against an undesirably critical critic
which would not backfire on their own reputation.
Free admission for critics has some interesting
implications for the consumer. The agent is receiving an
experience, at zero price, which the principals (consumers) must
pay for. This could be simply an additional fee for the agent on
top of their salary paid by, for example, a newspaper. To see the
implications assume two individuals with ex ante the same utility
function; let one be critic and one be consumer both of whom
attend the same performance. There will be a wealth effect which
would make the critic better off.
If we take account of psychological factors in decision
making it may be that the critic is worse off. The critic has to
attend a string of events as a job thus absenting most of the
elements of choice. There is no identity affirming content for
the critic in consuming a specific event. Indeed such content may
be manifested negatively in seeking out to find things to
criticize in the event i.e this will affirm one's identity as a
critic. The critic may even suffer from excessive specialization
in the form of satiation from excessive consumption of certain
type of product. Given the above we must face the problem that
critics could make themselves better off by ceasing to be
critics. An excessive focus on criticizing work rather than
enjoying it might be seen as a disadvantage of the division of
labour. This would not matter if we simply argued that critics
have different tastes from other people or that they were
incapable of other occupations. In the basic Freudian
explanation occupations are chosen because of subconscious
desires e.g. a surgeon may secretly take pleasure in cutting
people up. Cultural criticism may be just a different kind of
cutting people up. There can be a positive vision of criticism
(as in the quotes from France and Arnold) which could be
represented as an altruistic externality. In this case the critic
derives utility from promoting other people's satisfaction from
specific types of consumption.
Such views of criticism bring us back to the notion of
hirerarchies of utility. The critic is someone who believes there
is an order of types of satisfaction and that s/he has the
correct ranking of these. They are thus agents who are willing to
reduce the lower order utility of their principals in pursuit of
maximising higher order utility. This will be Pareto optimal so
long as the critics are leading the consumers toward the
preferences they would have chosen if they were suitably
informed. However, if critical preferences are not to be granted
autonomy and consumer preferences are shaped by critical
preferences then it becomes difficult to rank different outcomes
in terms of welfare.
VI. CONCLUSION.
Given the paucity of previous thought on the subject at
hand it is difficult to come to cut and dried conclusions. Most
of this paper is speculative; it identifies problems and
contradictions without attempting to resolve them. The main
theme that can be identified is the inadequacy of standard micro
theory as a vehicle for analysing cultural activity. Much of the
existing literature on cultural economics is little different
from what would be found in journals of market research or
industrial economics; studies of the cost functions of museums,
demand elasticities for symphony orchestras and so on. It is
perhaps time for a bit more speculation and less routine
application of standard tools.
As the above has been a general discussion we have resisted
detailed forays into any specific art form. To provide some
correction for this, the appendix provides a discussion of recent
developments in the case of recorded classical music in the U.K.
with reference to the areas highlighted above.
APPENDIX: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RECORDED CLASSICAL MUSIC IN THE
UK
The traditional recorded market was based on the idea of
attempting to reproduce the concert-going experience in the
buyer's living room. In the days of vinyl lp's the market was
small and dominated by a few companies. The dispersal of
critical output was through newspaper and magazine reviews.
There was no specific high street/populist magazine to provide
a helping hand for the novice consumer. The tone of critical work
(which can still be sampled on Radio Three) was essentially that
of imparting information to the informed. A reader would be
expected to have historical knowledge of the received body of
work and, even better, musical training. The consumer would be
regarded as falling down in their duty if they were merely
'hearing' as opposed to 'listening' to music; at the extreme the
ideal would be listening while following the score
[cp. Langer(1953)]. In these circumstances critics are
effectively policing a small closed market i.e. preventing the
arrival of inappropriate consumers as well as products. Consumers
are expected to arrive in this market having invested in the
requisite stocks of appreciation capital which form an entry
barrier to the potential entrant consumer. It could also be
argued that deterrence of the 'hearing' as opposed to 'listening'
consumer connotes a snob good aspect of music appreciation where
exclusion of some people adds to the benefits of consumption for
those inside the elite club.
Very recently the situation has changed. Classical music is
now marketed as a mass consumption good. Traditional consumer
resistance has been largely due to a high level of risk because
of entry barriers. A number of marketing ploys have been used to
reduce percevied risk:
1. The use of personalities to sell the product hence a disc may
become 'the new Nigel Kennedy record' [akin to the 'new album by
U2 or Genesis' in rock music] as opposed to 'a new version of
Beethoven's ....'.
2. The glamourisation of record sleeves and performers.
3. Changes in the retail outlets used i.e. placing a small stock
of recorded output in a multiple retail outlet such as a
newsagent or supermarket.
4. Repackaging of material. The best selling classical albums
are virtually all compilations of excerpts from complete works
which goes completely against traditional ideas of criticism
where one should put the effort into concentrated consumption of
complete works.
In the wake of this we now have magazines like 'Classic CD'
which began in the mid 1990's. Technical progress means that a
full magazine plus full length sampler CD can be produced at less
than a third of the price of a regular CD release. The use of the
timer function of the CD provides listener interaction with the
review. This is given in a non-technical way; descriptive
language is used e.g. a 'slow,graceful phrase ' 'one final
glowing surge of tone occurs' with time marks in brackets after
these descriptions. These 'free' discs with magazine are a case
of vertical integration between criticism and cultural output as
samples of product are dispensed with the critcism.
Given the above, questions arises as to whether the
form of criticism is exogenously determined by the intensity of
corporate promotion in conjunction with technical changes. This
would same to be the case with the new glossy magazine criticism.
However the old style criticism persists and its adherents would
see current trends as dangerous in failing to lead marginal
consumers on to the higher reaches of discerning consumption. In
terms of our paper the argument would be that lower order
preferences are being cultivated by manipulation of an
intrinisically higher order product.
One could argue that traditional criticism has trouble
regenerating itself because of the weight of the canon of
received masterpieces. Put bluntly accessible tuneful new or
recent work is disparaged as not sufficiently original whilst
original new work causes discomfort through verging perilously
close to unlistenability. Critics have here played the role of
lobbying for subsidy for the right to produce new and difficult
work. There are parallels with the cul de sac caused by critical
conern for originality in the art world. The crucial difference
is reproducibility. In visual arts a critic can create monopoly
value for art collectors but this will not occur for the
manuscript of a new piece of music.
Finally there is an obvious argument about welfare. In
terms of traditional criticism, the emerging market structure may
be inferior from what would be obtained by devoting the same
volume of promotional resources into cultivating higher order
preferences. This is an argument for taxing the private sector to
subsidise taste cultivation.
FOOTNOTES
I am grateful for the comments of Brian Burkitt and Ruth Towse on
an earlier version of this paper.
1. One could pursue the implied analogy further; food critics
quite clearly intend to do more than just satisfy a simple agency
function.
2..The problem of useless originality pervading econometric
studies in all fields of economics has been pointed out by
MITTELSTAEDT and ZORN [1984]
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