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Da-sein must be interrogated appropriately. In the first instance this will be in its 'average everydayness' - not in any sophisticated, abstract way of being (for example as a passive observer in the Cartesian tradition). We must start here because our understanding of being is distorted from the beginning. As we analyse everydayness we begin, admittedly, from within our misunderstanding (we cannot do otherwise) but we describe 'those aspects of Da-sein's (mis)understanding of itself that are least distorted because they do not directly involve Da-sein's making sense of its own being.' (Dreyfus, 1991: 35)
Further, it is only from the perspective of time that it is possible to glimpse the meaning of being: 'time is that from which Da-sein tacitly understands and interprets something like being' we are assured, though this is not immediately demonstrated. It is the intention of 'Being and Time' to show that this is so.
Da-sein is its past (since what we have been in large part determines what we now are and what we can become). In like manner, when embarking on the development of ontology we must be attentive to the traditions of the past since they determine (in large part) what can be developed. We are inextricably ensnared in the tradition, and it is necessary to acknowledge this (as far as we can). However, to make progress the past must be criticised or destructured.
Heidegger maintains that it is to the ancients that we must turn for wisdom in these matters. Though the tradition may often limit our investigations we have no choice but to learn from it. The destructuring of the tradition must be consciously undertaken within the insight of the importance of time. We seek to interpret 'the very basis of ancient ontology in light of the problem of temporality.'
A fundamental limitation is that Da-sein 'has the inclination to be entangled in the world in which it is and to interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light.' This has led to interpretive structures such as 'subject, the 'I', reason, spirit, person' which, Heidegger maintains, have become covered over within the western philosophical tradition. However, these seemingly self-evident concepts are not beyond question.
Destructuring is not destructive: it has a 'positive intent'. Though critical of tradition it affirms its positive possibilities.
Heidegger promises to investigate particular works of Kant, Descartes and Aristotle as they represent fundamentally decisive stages of the ontological tradition. (This part of the work was not completed.)
Phenomenology is 'phenomenon' plus 'logos'. By investigating the meaning of the constituent words Heidegger shows that phenomenology is 'to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself.' Phenomenology is method only and is not defined by what it treats (its content) at all. The maxim 'To the things themselves' is used to summarise this viewpoint.
Yet the phenomena of an ontological enquiry are not easily captured by this almost circular definition. Space and time, for example, cannot be seen within the 'ordinary' conception of phenomenon - they are not obviously things at all. But if these concepts cannot be grasped then an ontological enquiry is not possible. Somehow they, and being itself (i.e. what it is that 'lets anything show up as anything' (Dreyfus, 1991: 31)), 'must be able to become phenomena'.
Two parts, each in three divisions, are outlined. Only the first two divisions of 'Part One' were completed: