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Heidegger is seeking to describe 'being-in-the-world'. Having considered two key factors, namely the world and who it is who has this being, he turns to the activity of being-in as such. This will lead to an understanding of Da-sein's way of being, namely care.
Heidegger warns against attempts to derive being-in from something supposedly more basic. Being-in is primordial. This notwithstanding, he will demonstrate a number of constitutive characteristics of being-in, namely:
Each of these is equiprimordial.
We are reminded of an earlier, preliminary, discussion of being-in (§12) where it was established that Da-sein's being-in the world is not like that of one objectively present object 'in' another. However, if, for a moment, we collude with the picture of a person 'in' the world, i.e. we see human existence as a relationship between subject and objects, Heidegger suggests that it would be phenomenally more revealing to understand Da-sein as the being of this between (not of the 'subject'). Nevertheless, he quickly dismisses this notion, loath as he is to give any credence whatsoever to a 'subject-object' view. It is more important to see being-in-the-world as a unified existential and avoid splitting things up in the first place.
Da-sein, says Heidegger, is its 'there'; the 'Da' of Da-sein; 'the 'there' in which something like an occurrence of 'world' can take 'place' (Cavalier). And in order to be its 'there' Da-sein is not closed off, not to itself nor to the world. So Da-sein discloses and 'is its disclosure' and this in the sense of a lighted clearing in woodland. Dreyfus illuminates this metaphor with care:
'...Heidegger speaks of its there and of the clearing. Being-its-there is Dasein's opening onto the clearing... (T)he there is the existential version of an individual perspective on the shared situation or clearing... Each Dasein's there is the situation as organized around its activity. The shared situation is called the clearing; being-in-the-clearing is being-there.' (Dreyfus, 1991: 164)
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There is no simple English word for the existential 'Befindlichkeit' (variously translated as 'state-of-mind' (M&R), 'attunement' (JS), 'affectedness' and even 'where-you're-at-ness' (Dreyfus)). The sought-for word needs to express 'being found in a situation where things and options already matter' (Dreyfus, 1991: 168). Whatever word or phrase is settled on it is ontically manifest in moods. Moods show us how we find our 'being-in-the-world as a whole', they reveal the tone of our being-there: 'I am always attuned in some way to my overall situation. This is how I am there - or, better, how I am my 'there'.' (Polt, 1999: 66)
Sometimes moods disclose being as a burden (my being is always an issue for me since I must always do something). We do not know why, but in 'moodlike disclosure of the being of the there in its that' we glimpse that we have been thrown into our situation and 'that it is and has to be'. The idea of 'thrownness' emphasises Da-sein's past and the unalterable aspects of its existence. Though I may control my actions and even, within limits, master my moods, it remains true that my present mood is not mine to determine. I do, indeed, find myself in a certain way. Whether or not we believe we know where we come from and/or where we are going (for example in religious faith or rational understanding) thrownness confronts us - now - with our 'there'. And this 'is not a fact that is over and done with... It is a constant accompaniment of Da-sein's existence, poignantly revealed in certain moods.' (Inwood, 1999: 219)
Usually Da-sein does not dwell on the burden of being but turns away from what is disclosed. The nature of this evasion is clarified in the phenomenon of 'entanglement' (M&R: 'falling'), discussed later.
In the course of his discussion Heidegger states three essential ontological characteristics of 'Befindlichkeit' (attunement):
Almost all commentators lament M&R's translation of 'Befindlichkeit' as 'state-of-mind'. They perceive the danger that this suggests subjective mental states, something diametrically opposed to Heidegger's analysis. In Division II Heidegger characterises (and rejects) the subjectivist picture of moods as 'fleeting experiences which 'color' one's whole 'psychical condition' ([340], §68). That moods are not simply private mental states is further shown by the fact that, for Heidegger, they have public and social manifestations; indeed Da-sein can only have moods within a shared situation.
Sometimes 'moods' are about specific features or events. Such moods Dreyfus would wish to distinguish as 'affects' (Dreyfus, 1991:169). Affects (such as fear) reveal less about being-in-the-world than more general moods (e.g. anxiety - see §39-§42) but they nevertheless demonstrate the phenomenon of attunement. Heidegger considers the concrete example of fear.
Fear has three aspects:
What we are afraid of is 'always something encountered within-the-world'. In fearing itself 'what we have thus characterised as threatening is freed and allowed to matter to us' and 'circumspection sees the fearsome because it has fear as its state-of-mind' (M&R) (JS: 'because it is in the attunement of fear'). Finally, '(T)hat which fear fears about is that very entity which is afraid - Dasein.' (M&R)
This three-fold structure matches that explicated in the previous section (§29). It shows again Da-sein's openness, its being-in-the-world and the fact that things matter.
To the existential structure of attunement Heidegger adds, with equal status, understanding. Both are equally and fundamentally structures in which Da-sein is its 'there'. In attunement Da-sein is thrown from the past. In understanding Da-sein throws itself into the future.
Heidegger's 'understanding' is not one cognitive activity amongst many (like explaining, hoping or believing) but rather an existential that makes Da-sein capable of existing. It is a 'being-able-to-be', always directed towards the future where Da-sein, for whom being is always an issue, will necessarily bring about what is presently a possibility. Da-sein is never simply what it presently is but, primarily, 'is existentially that which it is not yet'. This 'potentiality of being' Heidegger incorporates within Da-sein's factical (as opposed to factual) content of being.
From the standpoint of objective presence, possibility is less than actuality - it characterises what is only possible, i.e. 'what is not yet real and not always necessary'. Existentially, however, Heidegger insists that possibility is more than actual objective presence: without Da-sein's being-possible there could be no disclosure of the world at all (and the world, of course, is disclosed not as objectively present but primarily 'as a space of practical possibilities that matter to us in specific ways' (Mulhall, 1996: 84)).
Understanding always presses forward into possibilities by 'projecting'. A footnote to M&R's translation explains that the basic meaning of projecting 'is that of 'throwing' something 'off' or 'away' from one... of 'designing' or 'sketching' some 'project' which is to be carried through... (and) of 'projection' in which a geometer is said to 'project' a curve 'upon' a plane'. (M&R: 185)
However, the project nature of understanding does not entail a well-conceived plan for an anticipated future. We may or may not achieve specific goals but this is of no consequence since understanding is the way of being of a potentiality, and this is never objectively present. '(U)nderstanding does not thematically grasp... possibilities themselves. Such a grasp precisely takes its character of possibility away from what is projected, it degrades it to the level of a given, intended content, whereas in projecting project throws possibilities before itself as possibility, and as such lets it be.'
Equally, understanding's project nature does not imply a freedom to pursue just any possibility. Our projection is not a free choice since, as a thrown being, Da-sein has already got itself into certain definite possibilities. Each person possesses an attuned understanding determined by the past it has been and still is. In short, Da-sein is a thrown thrower.
'The project of understanding has its own possibility of development. We shall call the development of understanding interpretation.'
In normal everyday coping what things are is not an issue: whilst coping there is no need to inquire. However when things are not going smoothly it becomes necessary to pay attention and act deliberately. Then it is as if it is necessary to ask what a certain object is. This circumspect (probably unarticulated) question will elicit the circumspect answer, 'It is for...'. This answer is more than mere naming. The object is, in fact, 'understood as that as which (it) is to be taken.' The answer will be expressed in practical activity, not words, and certainly does not depend on a statement or assertion about the object (but certainly precedes one, if it is made). Regardless of how this 'answer' is expressed the object will have been understood in its 'in-order-to' and taken care of in the light of 'as what' it is understood. This taking 'something as something' ('as a table, a door, a car, a bridge') is interpretation. There is no underlying pure perception that precedes circumspective, interpretive seeing. Just encountering something is to understand it in its involvements with the world (its reference relations). To see something 'free of the as' is a deficient, derivative seeing, achieved at some effort. In such a view the object is deworlded and no longer 'understood' at all.
When innerworldly beings are discovered, i.e. understood, they have meaning: 'Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself.' Meaning is not a property of things, but an existential of Da-sein so 'only Da-sein can be meaningful or meaningless.' Beings other than Da-sein, which cannot be so defined, must be understood as 'unmeaningful' (and possibly 'absurd', i.e. 'against meaning'). Da-sein cannot be absurd.
Interpretation depends, in Heidegger's analysis, on a 'fore-structure'; an apprehension of relevance that is always already understood. Heidegger analyses this prior conceptualisation of encountered objects into three layers:
The 'fore-conception' of our particular, practical interpretation of a thing is based on our 'fore-sight', that is, the context in which it is encountered, or the perspective, or point of view, from which it starts to make sense. A footnote to M&R's translation amplifies fore-sight as taking the 'first cut': 'The idea seems to be that just as the person who cuts off the first slice of a loaf of bread gets the loaf 'started', the foresight 'makes a start' on what we have in advance - the fore-having.' (M&R: 191) And it is this 'fore-having' - the third layer of interpretation - which is most basic of all; the basis, indeed, on which any thing at all is intelligible, the 'taken-for-granted background' (Dreyfus, 1991: 199) of everyday being-in-the-world.
Whether or not there really are three layers, the upshot of this analysis is that no interpretation is presuppositionless and precisely nothing can be understood free of pre-conceptions and taken as simply 'given'. This 'fore-structure' of interpretation appears to place understanding within a vicious circle, implying that nothing can be said to be known absolutely. Heidegger readily acknowledges the second point but vehemently rejects the appellation 'vicious'. Interpretation is indeed circular but to regret this and yearn for exact knowledge is 'to misunderstand understanding from the ground up.' 'What is decisive,' he says 'is not to get out of the circle, but to get in it in the right way.' Heidegger is neither a radical sceptic ('You can know nothing') nor a radical relativist ('Believe what you like'): Polt describes this interpretive circle without any negative overtones:
'Heidegger believes in objectivity - but objectivity does not mean the complete absence of prejudice and points of view. Instead, true objectivity involves a willingness to revise one's point of view in the light of what one discovers. Responsible interpreters approach things with presuppositions, but also adjust their presuppositions to the things... (the) hermeneutic circle is not a vicious circle that gets us nowhere. It can clarify and deepen our understanding.' (Polt, 1999: 71)
From understanding comes interpretation, and meaning is articulated (though not in words). From interpretation is derived 'assertion' (M&R) or 'statement' (JS), which is itself an interpretation though in a modified form. Words and/or non-verbal forms of communication are necessarily employed.
Assertion involves:
(Heidegger offers the simple statement 'The hammer is too heavy' as an example of an assertion.)
In 'pointing out' Heidegger insists that it is the object itself (of which the assertion is made) that is pointed out - not some representation of it - and that as ready-to-hand. As some definite character is attributed to the object the focus is narrowed to the object as a 'subject' to which the 'predicate' can be given. Finally, the statement is spoken forth and the definite character of the object is shared with others. So assertion is a 'pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates' (M&R).
Heidegger justifies his view that assertion is a form of interpretation by showing that it shares interpretation's 'fore-structure', previously described (§32). He then explains how interpretation is modified in assertion. Consider Heidegger's heavy hammer. When it is in use and found to be too weighty its user is likely to simply put it aside and find a more suitable tool. The underlying, unvoiced interpretation would be something like: 'Too heavy, the other hammer!' Up to this point the 'being held in fore-having' (i.e. the hammer) has been seen as a useful thing with which something is to be achieved. However, from the very moment that the interpretation is spoken forth (e.g. 'The hammer is too heavy') a 'transformation in the fore-having is already brought about beforehand' and the useful thing becomes an objectively-present object about which something can be said. 'The as-structure of interpretation has undergone a modification,' Heidegger declares; the existential 'hermeneutical as' (which points to the totality of relevance of a ready-to-hand thing) is levelled down to the theoretical 'apophantical 'as'' by which an objectively present object is determined in its specific character. (In practice interpretation is usually neither fully one thing nor the other. There are, Heidegger recognises, 'many interim stages'; for example 'statements about events in the surrounding world, descriptions of what is at hand, 'reports on situations', noting and ascertaining a 'factual situation', describing a state of affairs, telling about what has happened.')
Late in the discussion of 'Being-in as Such' (Chapter V) Heidegger adds a third existential structure, that of 'discourse' or 'talk' or 'telling' (Dreyfus, 1991: 213). This notion has been much used already, we are assured, but it has not been developed thematically. As an existential structure equiprimordial with the two already explained (attunement and understanding (§29-§31)) discourse is prior to, and underlies, interpretation (§32) and statement (§33).
Discourse, says Heidegger, is 'the articulation of the intelligibility of being-in-the-world.' Polt explains it as 'the fundamental way in which patterns of meaning are manifested to us,' (Polt, 1999: 74) and dwells on the literal meaning of articulation to clarify his point. Dreyfus does the same when he says:
Dreyfus continues: 'One manifests the already articulated structure of the referential whole in the most basic way simply by telling things apart in using them.' (Dreyfus, 1991: 215) But if discourse is not necessarily linguistic (it includes the possibilities of hearing and keeping silent and most articulations, expressed practically, are not even named) it is certainly expressed in language (discourse is 'the foundation of language,' says Heidegger, and 'Words accrue to significations'). Communicative discourse is not necessarily the making of a statement or an assertion - indeed, mostly it is not - but all discourse is necessarily about something. This is because Da-sein's being-in-the-world is also always about something and discourse simply manifests its worldly foundations.
Da-sein's being-in is always a being-with others. Though it does not make it so - it is the case anyway - discourse does make our shared experience (of attunement and understanding) explicit. Because Da-sein's being is always a 'with-being' language is emphatically not the means by which the inner content of one isolated mind is transmitted to another, since both speaker and listener are already 'outside'. Language is a means by which Da-sein is able to express itself, indicating in its manner of speaking its actual moods ('by intonation, modulation... the tempo of talk').
The phenomenon of hearing displays the intimate connection between discourse and intelligibility, already noted. It takes an effort, Heidegger maintains, to hear pure sounds. In the normal course of events we simultaneously understand what is heard in the act of hearkening: this is as true of listening to language as to other sounds. 'Discourse and hearing are grounded in understanding.'